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ABSTRACT

The Relationship Between Rumination and Metacognition:
Application of an Innovative Signal-Detection Approach

by

TANG Chak Man

Doctor of Philosophy

Rumination, a stable vulnerability marker of depression, is associated with lack of affective
bias towards positive information due to cognitive control deficit. However, whether
ruminators are self-aware remains unknown. Based on the signal-detection approach, the
present study examined metacognition associated with rumination. Specifically, metacognitive
sensitivity, the extent to which one’s confidence tracks task performance, was measured using
the meta-d’ method. In three directed-forgetting memory experiments, the present research
examined whether trait rumination (Experiment 1) and interaction between trait rumination
and mood state (Experiments 2 and 3) influenced metacognitive sensitivity. Participants were
asked to either forget or remember some affective pictures (i.e., pictures with negative or
positive valence). They then performed an old-new discrimination task and indicated
confidence rating for their responses. In Experiment 1, an interaction between Valence and
Rumination was found: High ruminators’ meta-d’ level decreased significantly when attending
to positive-valence images. In Experiments 2, participants performed a similar memory task
following either sad- or neutral-mood induction. An interaction among Valence, Rumination,
and Mood was observed: During sad mood, high ruminators’ meta-d’ level for processing
positive-valence images became significantly lower relative to low ruminators. In Experiment
3, participants’ memory task was preceded by either a rumination- or distraction-focused task.
Similarly, an interaction among Valence, Rumination, and Task indicated lower meta-d’ level
when high ruminators attended to positive-valence images after rumination task. These

findings suggest that trait rumination and sad mood state are associated with metacognitive
processing deficits in positive information. Clinical implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Vulnerability Factor of Depression
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is the commonest psychological disorder
worldwide (Liu et al., 2020). MDD has caused a serious economic burden all over the world
(Greenberg et al., 2015; Kenwood et al., 2019). The lifetime prevalence rate of depressive
symptoms is 33.7% (Salari et al., 2020) with a recurrence rate of 46.1% within 8 years
(Benjet et al., 2020). Due to this high prevalence rate and associated individual as well as
societal burden (Vigo et al., 2016), identifying mechanisms that involve in developing and
maintaining depression is considered an important task for mental health professionals and
researchers.
Theoretical models of depression (e.g., Beck, 2002; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) have
been developed to understand the underlying self-processing/beliefs and cognitive processes
of depressed patients. For instance, the relationship between rumination and depression has
been explained by Beck (1974, 2008)’s cognitive model of depression, whereby adverse
childhood experiences would develop defective cognitive schemas that constitute cognitive
vulnerability centrally. Also, this attribute is considered a latent trait that is subject to
activation by and interacts with individual life stressors, as well as contribute to one’s
development of mental disorders (Beck, 2008). Furthermore, Response Styles Theory (RST;
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) states that rumination as an affective bias towards past information,
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is a special form of response style (behaviors and thoughts that are emotionally focused on
the causation, meaning, and outcome of depressive symptoms) that closely links with
vulnerability of depression. Rumination in particular involves a sustained and repetitive style
of affective self-referent thinking. Self-reflection and mental questioning are involved, such
as asking “Why am I so tired?” or “I am a loser.” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1990). According
to RST, such persistent thinking is also considered a trait-like stable individual factor (NolenHoeksema & Davis, 1999). These long term, persistent styles of self-focused and emotional
thinking in turn impact the risk of depression (Beck, 1967, 1976; Mor & Winquist, 2002,
meta-analysis; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Specifically,
depressive ruminating responses are thought to prolong the duration and intensify symptom
severity as well as recurrence of depressive experiences (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990). One reason is that when depressed individuals engage in ruminative responses, they
will be distracted from engaging in active problem-solving planning and behavior, thus
exacerbating the stressful feelings and experiences. From this perspective, it is the
ruminative thinking (i.e., the information processing style) rather than the thought content
that matters.
1.2 Rumination
Rumination is characterized by biased affective memory that refers to a preferred style
of processing affective information that may involve one’s attending to the environment,
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interpreting information, and recollecting the past (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Specifically,
according to the rumination literature, affective memory bias is considered the most stable
among the several mentioned cognitive domains manifested by depressed individuals (Gupta
& Kar, 2012; Marchetti et al., 2018). For example, depressed individuals recall emotionally
charged (e.g., negative) information better and more frequently (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010),
especially information that is self-relevant (e.g., adjectives that describe oneself) (Benau et
al., 2019). It has been suggested that affective memory bias is a vulnerability factor, that
develops and maintains (Hamilton & Gotlib, 2008) one’s depression (Harmer et al., 2009;
Vrijsen et al., 2014) and its relapse (LeMoult et al., 2017). A recent study discovering the
depressotypic processing style characteristic of individuals with affective memory bias in
anxiety and depression points out the transdiagnostic nature of ruminators’ affective memory
bias (Duyser et al., 2020).
Neuropsychological research has increasingly provided evidence for the working of
affective memory bias. For instance, it has been shown that non-depressed participants who
have strong tendency towards negative memory also have a larger amygdala and smaller
hippocampal volumes (Gerritsen et al., 2012). This finding suggests that such increased
volume ratio between one’s amygdala and hippocampus is associated with psychological
vulnerability found in those with high risk for depression. Also, these structural brain
differences may pre-date one’s onset of depression (Gerritsen et al., 2012). In Kark and
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Kensinger (2019)’s recent study, 29 young adults were scanned while they incidentally
encoded negative, neutral, and positive scenes, each preceded by a line-drawing sketch of the
scene. Twenty-four hours later, participants were scanned during an Old/New recognition
memory task with only the line-drawings presented as retrieval cues. Although results
showed that enhanced online visuosensory recapitulation supports negative memory, and that
individual differences in “offline” increases in amygdala resting-state functional connectivity
(RSFC) immediately following encoding relate to negative and positive memory bias at test,
post-encoding increases in amygdala RSFC with visuosensory and frontal regions were
associated with the degree of negative and positive memory bias, respectively. These
neurophysiological findings suggest that valence-specific memory biases can be linked to the
way that sensory processes are integrated into amygdala-centered emotional memory
networks (Kark & Kensinger, 2019).
Moreover, using a recognition memory task, Hori et al. (2020) examined memory bias
in 50 civilian women with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and 70 non-trauma-exposed healthy
control women. They were all genotyped for the BDNF Val66Met (rs6265) polymorphism.
Patients showed significantly greater emotionally charged memory bias compared to
controls. In patients, negative memory bias significantly increased with increasing numbers
of Met alleles; while no significant relationship was seen in controls. The researchers further
revealed that patients with the Met allele had significantly greater negative biased-memory
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tendency than controls. Their results suggest that the relationship between PTSD and
affective memory bias can be moderated by the BDNF Val66Met polymorphism. Altogether,
these empirical results from neurophysiological and genetic studies have demonstrated some
substantial brain mechanisms of affective memory bias observed in both clinical as well as
nonclinical participants.
Besides the notion that ruminators’ affective bias towards negative information is
associated with a greater focus on past negativity (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), it can
equally be said that rumination is related to a lack of affective bias towards positive
information. In other words, rumination involves both increases in negative affect and
decreases in positive affect. It has long been suggested that negative affect and positive affect
are two independent psychological constructs (Diener & Emmons, 1985). For example,
Clark and Watson (1991) have suggested that depression, which is maintained and prolonged
by rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), is associated with both high degree of
negative affect as well as low degree of positive affect. Several other studies have also
supported the view that depression is related to less attention and responsiveness to positive
stimulation (Rottenberg et al., 2002; Sloan et al., 2002). Positivity effect refers to a bias in
information processing in which individuals place relatively greater emphasis on positive
than negative information in their memory and attention (Emery et al., 2020). This positive
rumination is defined as “one’s tendency to respond to positive affective materials with
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recurrent thoughts about positive self-qualities, positive affective experience, and favorable
life circumstances” (Feldman et al., 2008). According to the goal-related rumination theory
(Martin & Tesser, 1996), individuals engage in positive forms of rumination including
reminiscing and basking, to bolster their self-esteem and confidence when approaching new
challenges. In a similar vein, Larsen & Prizmic (2004) suggest that individuals actively
engage in emotion regulation strategies to maintain positive moods. These strategies, known
as ruminating on the positive, include focusing on personal strengths or favorable life
conditions (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). The calculation of individual memory bias by
examining age x valence interactions, or subtracting memory for negative material from
memory for positive (Reed et al., 2014). The literature shows that the tendency for depressed
individuals to be overgeneral was greater for positive cue words (Williams & Scott, 1998),
suggesting that it was partly responsible for the prolonged delay in depressed individuals’
recalling positive memories. Also, currently depressed patients were shown to tend to be
relatively more overgeneral when responding to positive words than negative words
(Williams & Dritschel, 1992). Further, depressed individuals who retrieved more overgeneral
memories, particularly to positive words, were found to take longer to recover (Brittlebank et
al., 1993). It is suggested that ruminative bias in affective memory may be due to an inability
to progress beyond a general level when ruminators attempt to retrieve specific positive
memories (Moore et al., 1988). Decreased positive affect has recently been associated with
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mild to moderate partial sleep deprivation in young adults (Saksvik-Lehouillier et al., 2020),
increased symptom severity in individuals with borderline personality disorder (Harp⊘ th et
al., 2021), lower levels of acceptance while higher levels of depressive symptoms (Shallcross
et al., 2010), and the COMT Val158 genotype in a Chinese adult sample (Cao et al., 204).
Therefore, lack of / decreased positive memory bias may be as important as bias towards
increased negativity for understanding rumination.
1.3 Measuring Rumination
Given that negative affect and positive affect are dimensionally separated (Diener &
Emmons, 1985), psychological measures have accordingly been developed to measure these
two constructs. First, for negative affect, the commonest quantitative measure of rumination
is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow
(1991), whereby assessment respondents are asked to indicate how much they experience
ruminative symptoms during a negative mood. Two distinct subtypes of rumination within
RRS have subsequently been identified, namely reflective pondering (internal focus on
cognitive problem solving to lift depression) and depressive brooding (passive selfcomparison with unachieved standards/unfulfilled objectives in terms of current situation)
(Treynor et al., 2003). Other measures include the Anger Rumination Scale (ARS;
Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) for assessing rumination about angry experiences, the Rumination
subscale of the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (rumin-RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell,
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1999) for assessing rumination of past events despite current emotional state, and also the
Rumination subscale of the Children’s Response Styles Questionnaire (CRSQ; Abela et al.,
2004) for assessing one’s self-focused responding to sad mood. In general, these commonly
used questionnaires measure rumination as an individual trait of habitual reaction to sad
mood (Rosenbaum et al., 2017).
Secondly, for positive affect, the Responses to Positive Affect (RPA) Questionnaire has
been recently developed by Feldman and colleagues (2008) to measure individuals’ selfreported level of ruminative and dampening responses to positive affect. The RPA
Questionnaire consists of three subscales known as dampening, self-focused positive
rumination, and Emotion-focused positive rumination.
1.4 Re-Conceptualizing Rumination: Cognitive Control Deficits
Given the pervasive maladaptive consequences of ruminative thinking, theoretical and
empirical studies have been conducted to understand the underlying mechanisms that
promote and maintain individual rumination (Yang et al., 2017). For instance, the cognitive
literature suggests that affective memory bias results from reduced cognitive control
(Connell et al., 2020; Joormann et al., 2011; Matt et al., 1992). Cognitive control is part of
the cognitive system that refers to the ability to configure the system to perform specific
tasks via properly adjusting one’s perceptual selection, response bias, and maintenance of
contextual information (Botvinick et al., 2001). As mentioned, among different cognitive
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domains, ruminators’ biased information processing in memory is most evident. This
preferential recall of decreased positive information has been found for autobiographical
details and lexical material (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), such as recalling less acceptance or
positive words (e.g., joy) than romantic rejection or negative words (e.g., death). In
psychological laboratory studies, ruminators have been shown to recall less positive words
than negative words on an explicit memory task (Matt et al., 1992), exhibit reduced
inhibition when processing negative English adjectives (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), and have
higher sorting costs for remembering negative words in reverse during a manipulation task
(Joormann et al., 2011). Dieler et al. (2014) found that worse suppression performance was
predicted by participants’ high brooding and anxious tendencies under Think / No-Think
paradigm, suggesting that rumination and anxiety traits may contribute to lowered cognitive
control (Beckwe et al., 2014). A recent meta-analysis (N = 3,066) of the linkage between
rumination and core executive functions indicated that rumination has a negative correlation
with individuals’ mental ability to set-shift or inhibit (Yang et al., 2017). In a recent
longitudinal study, Daches et al. (2019) showed that on immediate post-training trials and on
2-week follow-up tests, ruminators demonstrated transfer of inhibition training whose effects
also occurred on session-by-session and post-training measures of mood state assessed two
weeks later. Moreover, participants who were trained to inhibit affective material
subsequently showed less memory bias on a memory test, thus suggesting the causal role of
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biased inhibition in rumination. Research using emotional faces recognition to test
participants’ memory also indicates similar findings. For example, it was found that
attentional biases in processing emotional faces (i.e., selectively attending to others’ facial
responses) are evident even after recovery from a person’s depressive episode (Joormann &
Gotlib, 2007). Further, Johansson et al. (2004)’s event-related potentials (ERPs) data from
examining people’s facial recognition memory in differing expressions indicated that,
affective faces are recollected by participants to a greater extent than neutral faces as
reflected in the parietal ERP old-new effect and in the proportion of remember judgments.
Moreover, cognitive control functions are also known as executive functions (EFs) that
include working memory (WM), inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (Baddeley, 2007). The
term executive functioning applies to various cognitive processes that also include planning,
concentrating, and strategies for solving problems (Miyake et al., 2000). These EFs allow
individuals to self-regulate behavior, thoughts, and emotions to enable control over one self.
In this sense, rumination can be seen as an executive functioning problem. Indeed, it has
been suggested that rumination has a positive correlation with impaired core EFs (e.g., Mor
& Daches, 2015; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), as attentional mechanism deficits of inhibition is
thought to underlie rumination (Linville, 1996). Impairment in inhibition is subject to
repetitive internal thoughts due to enhanced retrieval of irrelevant information from longterm memory, thus making it more difficult for ruminators to erase them from working
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memory (Linville, 1996). Subsequently, trait ruminators’ having control deficits was
explained by the impaired disengagement theory (Koster et al., 2012), stating that reduced
attentional control will increase the likelihood to ruminate when individuals undergo a
negative (e.g., sad or lonely) mood state (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). More specifically, it is
suggested the interplay between trait rumination and mood state is facilitated by a person’s
failure to mentally take control of and withdraw from affective stimuli (Mor & Daches,
2015). Furthermore, the resource depletion theory (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008) points out
that ruminators are subject to widespread difficulties on EF tasks. By ruminating, one’s
attentional resources are occupied and consequently weakening EF abilities and performance
on concurrent tasks. Cropley et al. (2016) recently examined the relationship between workrelated rumination and executive functioning through three experiments. It was showed that
work-related rumination is related to measures of executive functioning, such as cognitive
failures, cognitive flexibility, and situational awareness at work. Secondly, participants with
medium and high work-related rumination reported more cognitive failures and greater
difficulties with lapses of attention. Finally, high work-related ruminators were shown to be
associated with difficulties with starting and finishing project work, fidgeting, recalling
events, following tasks in an orderly sequence, and lastly feeling compelled to do things.
Thus, it is argued that even work-related rumination is associated with executive functioning
deficits rather than work demands at such (Cropley et al., 2016).
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In short, the literature suggests that ruminators with diminished cognitive control
display a lack of positive memory bias that is associated with psychopathology.
1.5 Interaction between Trait Rumination and Sad Mood State
Rumination as a stable individual trait (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999) has been
found to be activated by a sad mood state (Cooney et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2020) or a
ruminative response (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). For instance, effect of
trait rumination and sad mood state has been studied on the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenalaxis (HPA) responses to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) (Shull et al., 2016), a tool for
investigating psychobiological stress responses in laboratory settings (Kirschbaum et al.,
1993). It was shown that participants high in trait rumination had prolonged duration of
cortisol activation in the rumination condition, compared to those in the distraction
condition. Importantly, while no main effects of either trait rumination or experimental
condition (i.e., induced sad mood state) were found, both appeared to interact for predicting
HPA responses in female participants. As already explained, this interaction is maintained by
ruminators’ inability to control their internal processing when faced with emotionallyvalenced stimuli and to disengage themselves (Mor & Dacches, 2015).
Moreover, the influence of interaction between trait rumination and sad mood state on
patients’ cardiovascular recovery following an emotionally-charged stressor has been
evaluated (Key et al., 2008). Results indicated that trait rumination and sad mood state
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interacted such that participants high in trait rumination had poorer diastolic blood pressure
and high-frequency heart rate variability recovery relative to those low in trait rumination. To
conclude, interaction studies have shown that sad mood state triggers trait rumination. In
order to identify how rumination affects cognitive processes for documenting its
mechanisms, it would deem important to also evaluate the interaction between sad mood
state and trait rumination when examining effects of lack of positive memory bias on
cognitive processes (Grant et al., 2019).
1.6 Positive Memory Bias and Directed-Forgetting Paradigm
Ruminators’ cognitive control deficits in memory bias has been studied using directedforgetting paradigm, which effectively tests memory bias of participants who are asked to
specifically forget some of presented information (Tekcan et al., 2008). For instance, high
ruminators recalled better to-be-remembered than to-be-forgotten items for intermixed
negative, positive, and neutral words in a directed-forgetting task (Wong & Moulds, 2007).
High ruminators also exhibited reduced forgetting of positive and negative to-be-forgotten
words, thus suggesting a relationship between rumination and directed-forgetting of
emotional material (Joormann & Tran, 2009). High ruminators have also been shown to
possess greater positive and negative metacognitive beliefs (de Jong-Meyer et al., 2009;
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Furthermore, Liang and colleagues (2011)’s directedforgetting experiment investigated whether socially anxious individuals show a memory bias
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for social information. Relative to non-anxious participants, socially anxious participants
showed a greater directed-forgetting effect for socially positive words in their free recall test,
indicating their more easily forgetting socially positive words than non-anxious participants.
Thus, socially anxious individuals lack the positive bias, that is, difficulty in forgetting
socially positive information, displayed by non-anxious individuals (Liang et al., 2011).
These findings indicate that the directed-forgetting paradigm has consistently demonstrated
the lack of positive memory bias shown by ruminators.
1.7 Limitation of Current Literature
Yet, although ruminators with lack of positive memory bias may have impaired
cognitive control, this primary-level processing outcome is only one possible pattern of
results. Secondary-level processes such as insight into and awareness of one’s lack of
positive memory bias or decreased positivity effect, referred to as metacognition (Livingston,
2003), is less clear. For example, whether ruminators are self-aware of their negative
information bias remains unknown. Indeed, while linkages have been established between
negative memory bias/trait rumination and psychopathology (Duyser et al., 2020), as well as
between (dysfunctional) metacognition and psychopathology (Sun et al., 2017), linkages
between negative memory bias/rumination and metacognition is surprisingly unknown. One
possibility is that rumination is associated with or caused by lacking self-awareness or
deficient metacognition of negative memory bias. The metacognitive literature indicates that
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there are three levels of cognitive processing, namely cognition, metacognition, and
epistemic cognition (Kitchener, 1989). Thus, to better understand the dynamics and
mechanisms of negative memory bias characteristics of ruminators, it is necessary to
research rumination beyond its well-established knowledge on primary level processing, by
exploring its understudied secondary-level metacognitive domain, which will be discussed
next.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Consciousness and Metacognition
Scientific investigation of consciousness and metacognition is a relatively new research
direction in psychology (Michel et al., 2018). Researchers in this field typically see measures
of participants’ claimed experiences of being conscious or self-aware in behavioral
experiments as equivalent to measures of introspection or metacognition (Fleming et al.,
2010; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Rounis et al., 2010), and the two terms are often used
interchangeably in spite of their different theoretical perspectives. In principle, consciousness
and metacognition are characteristically distinguished. While the latter refers to human’s
cognitive processing (e.g., monitoring) of other cognitive processes (e.g., remembering), the
former links to one’s conscious experience (e.g., feeling pain). Metacognition is considered a
secondary level processing of cognition, whereas consciousness is a secondary level
processing of conscious experience (Dienes & Seth, 2010). Thus, despite their highly
overlapping brain mechanisms, metacognition and consciousness are defined differently by
different researchers. Classically, cognition is a person’s transforming and using of sensory
input from both the external and internal environment (or without, as during hallucinating or
imaginative states) (Neisser, 1967). However, these individual transformations or processes
are only to be observed and then inferred either by themselves or others, hence their
functional definability (e.g., study of the memory system in terms of processes). Cognitive
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psychologists would usually study particular mental states that they believe are about other
cognitive states instead of phenomena that are occurring exteriorly, that is, research
participants’ metacognitive states (Shimamura, 2000).
Although sophisticated metacognitive knowledge has been evident in cultures since
antiquity, only since the 80s have researchers begun to systematically investigate
metacognition (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Consequently, self-awareness has been
conducted under metacognitive research (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Ko & Lau, 2012) which
has recently increased in volume (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Fairfield et al., 2015;
Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011; Maniscalco et al., 2016; Papageorgiou &
Wells, 2003; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000; Teasdale et al., 2002). Metacognition derives from
traditional research areas of self-reflection and self-awareness which could date back as far
as the ancient Greece (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).
2.2 Defining Metacognition
Metacognition is a term borrowed from “metamemory” and has been used for new
research inquiry since Flavell (1979). It was first described as thinking about thinking
(Flavell, 1971). This metacognitive ability is known to be evident since childhood (Flavell,
1979). Other terms have been interchangeably used in the metacognition literature, such as
meta-learning (Akturk & Sahin, 2011), meta-mentation (Bogdan, 2000), self-management
(Rivers, 2001), metacognitive beliefs, as well as judgment of learning (Veenman et al.,
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2006). In short, metacognition is cognition about cognitions that are responsible for
awareness and internal process monitoring, appraisal, and control (Wells, 2009). In recent
research, metacognition is defined as evaluation of one’s own task (Fleming & Dolan, 2012).
It is suggested that one’s self-knowledge is inferential rather than based on his or her access
to self-mental processes (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). Thus, a research participant would
be asked to provide confidence rating during some task performance (e.g., visual
discrimination task or recognition task in memory studies).
Metacognitive research has been conducted from various approaches to explore
people’s metacognitions. For example, cognitive psychologists have sought to understand
how people monitor and control their minds (which are two central components of
metacognition), while developmental psychologists have outlined the growth of
metacognition in childhood and its decline in late adulthood. Moreover, metacognition is
well established as an internal, psychological process necessary for effective learning and
problem solving (Flavell, 1979). Educational psychologists have sought to understand how
students can take advantage of their metacognitive skills in terms of improving their
educational outcomes. For example, recent opinions have been formulated as to suggest how
educational policies and practices can be improved at in schools regarding the successfulness
and efficiency of teaching metacognition (Perry et al., 2019). Studies on the relevance of
metacognition to eyewitness testimony, legal procedures, and even some nonhuman animals
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such as chimpanzees which are believed to be capable of monitoring their own thoughts have
also been conducted in the field.
It can be seen that research interest in metacognition has been increasing over the past
decades. As researchers have studied more aspects of human metacognition, its components
have also been understood more fully, which will now be discussed.
2.3 Metacognitive Subcomponents
Metacognition has been understood as comprising three subcomponents including
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control (Dunlosky
& Metcalfe, 2009). Metacognitive knowledge refers to declarative knowledge about a kind
of cognition (e.g., knowledge about how learning operates and how it can be improved).
Declarative knowledge consists of facts, beliefs, and episodes that the person can
consciously describe to others (e.g., providing one’s home address, religion, and past
experience in a job application form) (Squire, 1986). These facts can be general (e.g., the
knowledge that people who are told to remember specific things will subsequently recall
them better) as well as specific (e.g., the belief that one has problem recalling things in the
past), be they correct or not.
Secondly, metacognitive monitoring refers to self-assessment of his or her currently
engaged activity (e.g., judging whether I am approaching the exit in a maze). For example,
research participants would be asked to explicitly judge a cognitive state in metacognitive
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experiments. They may need to judge how well they have learned the major parts of the
brain during a fMRI study. In the educational context, students’ metacognitive monitoring is
measured by calibration indicators that are based on the correspondence between their
cognitive performance and metacognition in terms of confidence judgment (Lingel et al,
2019).
Researchers investigating depression have proposed that impaired metacognitive
monitoring as dysfunctional thinking could be a cause of major depressive disorder. For
instance, Sheppard and Teasdale (2000)’s study using latencies to Dysfunctional Attitude
Scale and neutral statements showed that while responses that were incompatible with
functional cognitive schemas were significantly slowed for the controls, depressed patients
displayed no sign of selective slowness in those responses. The authors attempted to explain
depressed patients’ fast response to dysfunctional attitude in terms of their lacking
metacognitive monitoring, thus suggesting that depressed patients’ negative thinking reflects
impaired metacognitive monitoring of their maladapted cognitive products.
Lastly, metacognitive control is defined as the act of regulating some dimensions of a
cognitive activity (e.g., students deciding whether to spend more time revising the thesis for
final submission to the school). Metacognitive knowledge is important in this case as the
person needs it to regulate the act hoping for a better grade result.
All in all, metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive
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control are distinctive yet related subcomponents that constitute human’s metacognition.
2.4 Neural Basis of Metacognitive Ability
Recent studies of neuroscience have empirically demonstrated a substantial neural basis
of related metacognitive abilities. For instance, convergent evidence shows that the function
of the rostral and dorsal aspect of the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for accurate
retrospective judgment of performance, whereas the medial PFC is responsible for
prospective judgments of performance (Fleming & Dolan, 2012), thus pointing out possible
neural substrates of human metacognitive accuracy. McCurdy et al. (2013) have empirically
demonstrated that whereas metacognitive capacity is positively correlated with activations
within both the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) and the precuneus, memory metacognition
is positively correlated with activation within the precuneus, suggesting a correlation
between the two distinct metacognitive systems, namely memory and visual perception.
Using recognition-memory testing, it was found that firstly activations in the medial
temporal lobe were associated with actual encoding success (implying greater activation for
objectively remembered than forgotten scenes), but not with predicted encoding success
(activations did not differ for scenes predicted to be remembered versus forgotten). Secondly
and conversely, activations in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) were associated
with predicted but not actual encoding success and correlated with individual differences in
the accuracy of judgments of learning. Also, activations in the lateral and dorsomedial
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prefrontal cortex were associated with both actual and predicted encoding success (Kao et
al., 2005). These findings indicate specific dissociations and associations between the neural
systems that mediate actual and predicted memory formation. It is also suggested that the
VMPC plays a critical role in frontal-lesion patients’ judgments about the retrievability of
information as a critical part of the metamemory processes engaged during remembering
(Schnyer et al., 2004).
To conclude, these evidences point to a neural basis for metacognition, whose
relationship with rumination and depression are discussed now.
2.5 Metacognition, Rumination, and Depression
The literature indicates that there are relationships among the three variables covered in
the present study, that is, metacognition, rumination, and depression. Metacognition as
counter-productive responses to internal events is thought to contribute to the maintenance of
emotional disturbance and psychological disorders (self-regulatory executive function model
of psychopathology; S-REF; Matthews & Wells, 2004; Wells & Matthews, 1996). It is
claimed that dysfunctional metacognition serves an important function in developing as well
as maintaining major forms of psychopathological conditions (Wells & Matthews, 1994).
Furthermore, rumination is believed to be part of the cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS)
(Kowalski & Dragan, 2019; Wells, 2009) , which has been observed and interpreted as the
cause of psychological problems in clinical and population-based studies (Borkovec et al.,
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1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Wells & Matthews, 1996).
Dysfunctional S-REF traps individuals’ information processing in a sustained, perpetual
cycle, thus prolonging and intensifying emotional disturbance. Accordingly, it is how
individuals perceive and then regulate their thinking that matters despite contents (Wells,
2009).
There are two general aspects constituting individuals’ metacognitive beliefs that are
considered psychologically detrimental, namely positive metacognitive beliefs about how
useful it is to engage in rumination (e.g., ‘feeling uneasy will help me manage’), and
negative metacognitive beliefs about these ruminative thoughts and feelings (e.g., ‘feeling
uneasy will ruin my mentality’). The S-REF model shows that CAS strengthens through
negative metacognitive beliefs that associate losing control and interpreting psychological
phenomena in a terrifying way (Wells, 1994, 2009). Besides, in some psychiatric patients
there are two other relating aspects of metacognition that have been identified, known as
cognitive confidence (i.e., how and what one thinks about his or her cognitive abilities, such
as memory) and self-awareness (i.e., one’s propensity to being aware of, controlling, and
monitoring his or her own thinking) (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells, 2009). The
rumination literature shows that depressed patients simultaneously possess the positive
aspect and negative aspect of metacognitive beliefs (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001), which are
shown to link with rumination and state-trait depression respectively (Papageorgiou et al.,
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2001a).
Therefore, the relationships among metacognition, rumination, and depression are
empirically as well as theoretically grounded. As a result, reviewing recently established
metacognitive interventions would be the next step.
2.6 Metacognition Related Interventions
Given the central role played by metacognition in S-REF (Matthews & Wells, 2004;
Wells, 2009), studies on establishing effective interventions for depression have also made
use of results from metacognitive studies. For instance, it has been pointed out that an
essential component of a prevention intervention against relapse is to learn the metacognitive
skills to “nip in the bud” negative thinking patterns once they begin to surface when
dysphoria is present (Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000). Also, cognitive therapy for reducing
depressed patients’ relapse is suggested to be operated by changing patients’ relationships to
their negative thoughts rather than the content (Teasdale et al., 2002). Based on the observed
mediation of increased metacognitive awareness of depressed patients between cognitive
therapy and depression, it is argued that patents’ metacognitive awareness refers to his or her
third-person or decentered perspective of experiencing negative thoughts - seeing them as
passing events (Teasdale et al., 2002). Most recently, several self-awareness and selfunderstanding-oriented metacognitive therapies (MCTs) have emerged encouraging
depressed patients to gain insights into self-knowledge for fighting against depression
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(Philipp et al., 2019).
As more findings have been available and conclusions drawn from recent
metacognitive research and interventions, the umbrella term of metacognition has been
increasingly thought to be consisted of distinct systems.
2.7 Distinct Metacognitive Systems
Metacognition has been conducted with respect to different metacognitive capacities,
such as visual perception, working memory, emotional metamemory, and learning.
Specifically, in the memory domain, Caviola et al. (2009)’s study examines whether school
children’s visuospatial working memory (VSWM) can be improved by providing them with
metacognitive training, and the result indicates a specific improvement of performances in a
sequential-spatial working memory task. It has also been shown that metacognitive
capacities positively link with two different visual tasks (Song et al., 2011). More recently,
visual metacognitive capacity and memory metacognition have been experimentally
distinguished as two distinct metacognitive systems under the word memory task and visual
perception paradigms (McCurdy et al., 2013).
On the other hand, metamemory has become a hot research topic in the 21st century
(Sahakyan & Foster, 2016). It refers to people’s knowledge and awareness of their own
memory processes, including the ability to monitor and control the learning process.
Metamemory researchers are concerned with mechanisms that improve memory. Recently,
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Sahakyan & Foster (2016) have even subdivided metamemory into meta-remembering and
meta-forgetting, highlighting the distinction between remembering and forgetting as different
dimensions of human memory. One line of research steaming from metamemory investigates
emotion as an independent variable that affects memory, namely metacognition in affective
memory or metamemory (self-awareness of memory processing) (for a review, see Fairfield
et al., 2015). Metamemory consists of declarative (explicit memory content and accessibility
knowledge) and procedural components (control and monitoring of memory) (Metcalfe,
2000) that includes a variety of self-assessment strategies, such as ease-of-learning
judgments and feeling-of-knowing judgments made during material learning (Fairfield et al,
2015). In this sense, self-memory knowledge is positively associated with planning and
monitoring learning capacities. Moreover, metamemory awareness is positively related to
one’s life experience, feedback from others, and individual as well as group reflection rather
than links with factors such as memory or intelligence (Fairfield et al., 2015). It is also
thought to be related to task demands and personality factors (Kelemen et al., 2000), since
metamemory involves self-efficacy that implies judgments and beliefs about one’s task
performance (Gist & Mitchell, 1992).
Research on metacognitive learning has proliferated over recent decades. For instance,
students’ metacognitive regulation is positively related to their implement learning capacities
(Stanton et al., 2015) and evaluating ability for future planning and learning (Bull et al.,
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2016). These abilities can positively affect learning and achievement (Wang et al., 1990).
Moreover, it is suggested that classroom environment instruments can act as reliable
indicators for monitoring changes, in psychosocial dimensions of classroom environments
that can be directly related to students’ metacognition (Thomas & Anderson, 2014). Further,
experiential learning has been found to be more effective than direct instruction in terms of
teaching metacognitive theory, suggesting that students may process information at a deeper
level and recall more information when taught the former (Richmond et al., 2017).
All in all, the metacognitive education literature has shown a positive relationship
between learners’ metacognitive abilities and their task performance.
2.8 Metamemory Techniques
Metamemory researchers often use procedural techniques including Feeling-ofKnowing (FOK) judgments (estimation on the likelihood of remembering previously studied
items) (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Modirrousta & Fellows, 2008; Schnyer et al., 2005;
Schwartz, 1994; Souchay et al., 2004; Swerts & Krahmer, 2005), Judgments-of-Learning
(JOL; predictions of future memory performance) (Besken & Mulligan, 2014; Dunlosky &
Connor, 1997; Kao et al., 2005; Kennedy & Yorkston, 2000; Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003;
Modirrousta & Fellows, 2008; Souchay et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1994; Townsend & Heit,
2011), Ease-of-Learning (EOL; prediction of memory ability based on task description) (Cull
& Zechmeister, 1994; Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Nelson & Leonesio, 1988; Thiede et al.,
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2003; Watanabe, 2001), and Remembering or Knowing (R/K; estimation of remembering
versus feeling confidence) (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Chua et al., 2006; McCabe &
Soderstrom, 2011; Wolk et al., 2007). Each of these techniques and their relationships with
metacognition will be briefly introduced now.
2.9 Feeling-Of-Knowing Judgments
Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments refer to one’s prediction of how likely he or she
will subsequently recognize currently unrecalled material, such as the ability to recognize an
item from a list even though it cannot be brought to memory successfully. Subsequently, if
the person is unable to retrieve the item, he or she is asked to judge feeling-of-knowing and
then to recognize it using a Likert scale (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Individuals often have
above-chance accuracy in predicting whether they are able to recognize information that
cannot be recalled (Costermans et al., 1992; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990). Also, subjective
judgments are believed to be used for making accurate prediction of one’s performance in
memory (Koriat, 1993; Mazzoni et al., 1997; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010).
2.10 Influence of Emotional Valence on FOK Judgments as Metacognition
FOK studies have also been conducted to explore its relationship with emotional
valence. For instance, FOK judgments are shown to be determined by the amount of partial
contextual information accessed, regardless of its correctness (Koriat, 1993) according to the
accessibility model (Thomas et al., 2011). It is suggested that assessing partial information
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(i.e., valence) may lead to additional evaluation and search processes that trigger more
accurate FOKs that depend on what material is used.
2.11 Judgments-Of-Learning
Research has long examined individuals’ predictions of their future memory
performance, typically referred to as judgments of learning (JOL) (Rhodes, 2016). In Nelson
and Narens (1990)’s classic framework for considering metacognition, cognitive processes
have been divided into those that relate to assessing individual learning (monitoring) and
those to self-regulated learning based on information that is obtained from monitoring
(controlling). This link between monitoring and control is a fundamental assumption of
metacognition research (Rhodes, 2016). JOLs constitute one type of introspective judgment
that provides input to a metacognitive system that may change individual behavior.
According to Nelson and Narens (1990)’s framework, JOLs are listed as one of several
prospective monitoring judgments possible in anticipating future memory performance.
Methods of JOL have been established with variations in the metacognitive literature
(Rhodes, 2016). For instance, Nelson et al. (2004) created the prejudgment recall and
monitoring procedure to assess individuals’ contents of memory that inform predictions by
asking participants to engage in retrieval just prior to providing a JOL. On the other hand,
Castel (2008) introduced the pre-study JOL procedure in which participants are given
information about the nature of a study item, and make their JOL prior to actually viewing
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the item.
Rhodes and Tauber (2011)’s meta-analytic review shows that delaying JOLs leads to
robust benefits to relative accuracy. Also, delayed JOLs results in a modest but reliable
benefit for memory performance relative to immediate JOLs. Finally, it is suggested that
delayed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnostic information from long-term
memory rather than being a by-product of a retrieval opportunity (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011).
2.12 Ease-Of-Learning
Research into Ease-Of-Learning (EOL) judgments have been conducted within
metacognition and learning (e.g., Burkett & Azevedo, 2012; McCormick, 2003; Perfect &
Schwartz, 2002), which are considered a central as well as continuous process of everyday
life. EOLs, as defined as timing and tasking (Jemstedt et al., 2017), are thought to guide
individuals’ study behavior and learning (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Measures of accuracy of
EOLs can be distinguished between relative accuracy (alternatively known as resolution) and
absolute accuracy (also known as calibration).
2.13 Remembering or Knowing
Remembering versus knowing studies have been conducted under the metacognitive
paradigm (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Souchay et al., 2013). Remember or Knowing
(R/K) refers to the argument that both remembering and knowing depend on two distinctive
kinds of experiencing (Knowlton & Squire, 1995). For example, one remembers an old item
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(item that he or she believes has been seen) when it evokes a recollection of it having
specifically been encountered previously. On the other hand, one knows the item when it
evokes a sense of familiarity without actually having recollected a specific pervious
encounter. Such distinction is similar to that between explicit and implicit memory, as well
as between declarative memory and nondeclarative memory (Squire et al., 1993; Tulving &
Schacter, 1990). The distinction contrasts the ability to consciously recollect recently
occurring facts and events with the ability for a variety of unconscious memory abilities,
such as priming, learning techniques, as well as classical conditioning of simple kinds
(Knowlton & Squire, 1995). In a series of experiments investigating participants’ response
times for remember and know responses in recognition memory, Dewhurst et al. (2006) have
shown that remembering is faster than knowing in terms of faster response times for
remember responses.
2.14 Metacognitive Research in Directed-Forgetting Paradigm
Besides the aforementioned metamemory research techniques, metacognitive studies
have also been commonly conducted using directed-forgetting. Originally used by studies
examining “intentional forgetting” in the laboratory (Hockley et al., 2016; Lee & Lee, 2013;
Sahakyan & Foster, 2009; Wylie et al., 2008), recent metacognitive studies have been
conducted using the directed forgetting approach. Directed forgetting was first used by
Brown (1954) as an unusual procedure to study interference in short-term retention. In this
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classical study the participants saw four rapidly presented arrow – number pairs on each trial.
Either before or just after the stimuli were presented, instructions were given to recall only
the arrows, only the numbers, or both, in a specified order. Recall of the arrows was
unaffected by condition. For the numbers, however, being told in advance what to recall was
much better: This was true for numbers only (M = .78 before and .51 after), for numbers first
(M = .61 before and .36 after), and for numbers second (M = .48 before and .39 after). It was
especially noteworthy that instructions to recall only the numbers led to better memory even
when the instructions were given after encoding. Brown (1954) concluded that selective
rehearsal of the numbers during presentation might have produced some of the difference.
A decade later, Muther (1965) employed a similar manipulation which asked the
participants to see several lists of 20 letters but were told that, for some lists, only 10 of the
letters would have to be recalled later. The 10 to-be-omitted letters were cued by either a
preceding or a succeeding blank field. Compared to control lists of only 10 letters, where
recall accuracy was .74, accuracy for cued lists averaged .61, which was a significant
reduction. Thus, the letters that did not have to be recalled still interfered with those that did.
A more intriguing finding concerns the comparison of the 20-letter lists with a no cuing
condition. Correct recall in this case was only .46. It was very clear that being allowed to
omit half of the letters from recall resulted in significantly improved performance on the
remaining ones. Following the two classical studies mentioned above, a new technique arose
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for studying, that is, “updating of memory” (Bjork, 1972). Initially known was instructions
to forget (e.g., Bjork et al., 1968), and variously called positive, voluntary, motivated, or
intentional forgetting, the name was eventually finalized by scholars to be coined “directed
forgetting” (Bjork, 1972; Epstein, 1972). Since earlier works on directed forgetting (e.g.,
Block, 1971; Muther, 1965), there have been two common procedures for presenting the
instructional cues to subjects regarding which items to forget versus remember. Under the
item method, the subject is given an explicit cue for each to-be-forgotten item (F word), such
as "forget" or "FFFF”. Usually, researchers also signal each to-be-remembered item (R word)
with a complementary cue, such as “remember” or “RRRR”. Typically, the cue comes after
the relevant word, ensuring that the subject registered the word. When the list method is
used, only one cue would be presented (e.g., instruction to forget all preceding items) in the
middle of the list.
The directed-forgetting literature suggests that instructing to remember or forget task
items are effective when research participants are metacognitively judging, whereby they are
aware of own control of remembering as well as forgetting material (Friedman & Castel,
2011). Also, it has been suggested that forgetting appears to be more taxing than
remembering after the memory cue within seconds in directed-forgetting experiments (Lee &
Hsu, 2013). More recently, it is concluded that participants in item-method directed
forgetting control rehearsal by selectively retrieving earlier items that are believed to be
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more memorable, even when such beliefs are but illusions (Sahakyan & Foster, 2016).
2.15 Behavioral Measures of Metacognition
In recent years, behavioral measures for metacognitive processing in perceptual and
memory tasks have been developed and commonly used, including introspection, confidence
rating, and Post-Decision Wagering (Overgaard & Sanderg, 2012; Sheppard & Teasdale,
2000; Wells et al., 2012). First of all, the use of introspection is hardly a new method as it
had been classically used during the beginning of experimental psychology. For example,
William James believed that one method to study the mind should be the direct, inner
observation of consciousness (Lyons, 1986). A broadly discussed account, mentioned by
William James among others, defines introspection as a self-reflective, retrospective process
in which an individual’s memory trace of the original target mental state is inspected. In
more recent accounts, introspection has been understood and investigated as an ‘on-line’
inspection of current and ongoing mental states. The available definitions of introspection
agree, however, that it should be defined as some sort of observation of or attention to what
is subjectively experienced (Lyons, 1986; Marcel, 2003; Overgaard, 2006).
Secondly, confidence judgment refers to the act of judging one’s confidence in whether
the answer is correct, when he or she is answering a question such as telling a new friend the
location of a local favorite restaurant, or a train station staff showing the direction towards a
destination asked by a passenger. In other words, participants’ ability to consciously
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introspect on their own perceptual processes (i.e., metacognition) is reflected by their
confidence rating. Confidence judgments are also known as retrospective confidence (RC)
judgments and that much of the research in the field involves having participants rate the
likelihood that their answers are correct (Massoni et al., 2014; Rouy et al., 2020, metaanalysis; Sporer et al., 1995, meta-analysis). Similar to other metamemory judgments, RC
judgments also serve to regulate memory because it relates to the confidence one has in his
or her beliefs (Chua et al., 2009). This metacognitive knowledge plays a central role to
decide whether the person will withhold or share an answer. Given that people’s confidence
is based on the amount, speed, or clarity of what comes to mind, as well as the surrounding
details indicating that the event was real, confidence would be expected to be a good
indicator of correctness in the case of relatively easy judgmental tasks (Nickerson &
McGoldrick, 1963). Indeed, there are a host of confidence studies that begin with people
being presented with word lists (e.g., DeSoto & Roediger, 2014; Hintzman, 2004; Roediger
& DeSoto, 2014). During a later test, participants are shown each word again, along with foil
new items that they did not study, and then are asked to indicate whether each word was
presented earlier. Participants also make a confidence judgment about their performance (i.e.,
whether each recognition decision is correct). What is noticeable is that the relative accuracy
of participants’ confidence rating is high. Lastly, decision wagering as an experimental tool
that is thought to be capable of measuring participants’ awareness objectively (Persaud et al.,
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2007), has widely been used for consciousness measurement in experimental cognitive
research (e.g., Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Pasquali et al., 2010; Schurger & Sher, 2008; Vo et
al., 2014). Similarly, Post-Decision Wagering (PDW) as a new measure of awareness
requires participants to wager high versus low on task decisions.
In sum, the studies discussed in this section show how introspection, confidence rating,
and PDW are employed for measurement of metacognitive processing in experimental tasks
that assess individual memory and perception.
2.16 Response Bias
Nevertheless, such aforementioned methods that claim to measure metacognition have
been criticized as subjective as well as susceptible to overconfidence (Maniscalco & Lau,
2012), which are likely to weaken the objectivity of participants’ behavioral data. First, the
number of methodological arguments against the use of introspection to study metacognition
or consciousness is enormous. Most of them circle around one central claim that
introspection does not give reliable and valid information about conscious processes. For
example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) presented empirical evidence that subjects have little
introspective access to the causes of their choices and behavior. In one example, they showed
that participants had a bias to prefer objects presented to the right, yet when asked, they
never mentioned the location of the object as their reason for preferring it. However,
participants giving an introspective report about liking objects presented to the right for some
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other reason than the object’s location in space, may be giving a perfectly good and
scientifically usable report of what they experienced. The researchers correctly rejected
introspection as a methodology to learn about (some aspects of) choice and decision-making,
as the behavioral data suggested a quite different explanation from the one that participants
reported. Also, it is argued that introspection is not exclusive and specific about one’s
conscious state (Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
Moreover, confidence rating is subject to response bias such as individual under- or
over-confidence. People’s confidence in their memories can be entirely inaccurate, yet they
may also be entirely unaware that their confidence in memory is biased. Two effects in
particular – the overconfidence effect and the hard-easy effect – have interested researchers
and stimulated heated debates about what factors diminish the accuracy of RC judgments.
For instance, in an influential review of the confidence literature, Lichtenstein et al. (1982)
reported data from four early studies that illustrated typical outcomes in the field (also see
Keren, 1991; McClelland & Bolger, 1994). In these studies, participants answered generalinformation questions (e.g., “What is the name of a dried grape? Raisin or prune?”), and then
made a confidence judgment for each answer. The result indicated that participants provided
significantly overconfident responses in regard to how correct their answers were. As an
example, for answers that elicited extreme confidence (i.e., participants’ responses were 1.0),
the corresponding level of correct performance was below .85. Based on such outcomes
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along with others, Lichtenstein et al. (1982) concluded that “the most pervasive finding in
recent research is that people are over-confident with general-knowledge items” (p. 314). On
the other hand, although over-confidence does appear most readily with questions (or tests)
that are difficult, people’s RC judgments are often under-confident when questions (or tests)
are relatively easy. Calibration curves for retrospective confidence judgments often show
that people are under-confident when making lower judgments but overconfident when
making higher judgments, hence the name hard-easy effect (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).
The question of why people are so often overconfident in judging the quality of their
knowledge has led to the development of two relatively polar views, which differ in regard to
how much people are to blame for their poor judgment accuracy (Jungermann, 1983). First,
according to the pessimistic view, people are inherently poor at judging internal states and
are largely to blame for being over- or under-confident. In contrast, the optimistic view states
that people are actually good at making such judgments, but psychological experiments are
set up in a manner to make people look bad. As an example from the former camp, Tversky
and Kahnemans (1974)’s heuristics approach claimed that people’s decisions are irrational,
because they are based on heuristics that can systematically distort judgments. In contrast,
Gigerenzer et al. (1991)’s probabilistic mental model theory claims that the tricky questions
used by experiments make otherwise good judges appear inaccurate. Besides over- or underconfidence, confidence rating can also be subject to type 1 sensitivity, known as the ability to
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distinguish stimuli (task performance). For instance, participants’ confidence-accuracy
correlations may simply result from over-confidence, rather than due to type 2 sensitivity
(their ability to track task performance accurately through confidence ratings) (Maniscalco &
Lau, 2012).
Finally, like confidence rating, PDW can neither run away from being subject to
response bias. Participants may claim not to know anything though they do (Dienes & Seth,
2010). Also, the relationship between wagering and awareness is not direct, because postdecision wagering reflects not only awareness of the sensory evidence, but also the wagering
strategy of the subject (Clifford et al., 2008). Further, reported confidence rating is especially
problematic for young children and non-human animals (Seth et al., 2005a) as their
conscious states are questionable (Ruffman et al., 2001). Any metacognitive approach used
to study animals would be constrained by nonhuman participants’ inability to produce verbal
report (Edelman et al., 2005). For instance, using the commentary key method which allows
monkeys to make second-order discriminations on previous perceptual discriminations, it
was found that monkeys with brain-lesion were unable to distinguish between a stimulus
presented in the affected area and a blank display presented in an unaffected visual field
(Cowey & Stoerig, 1995). In a more recent study exploring methods for uncertainty
monitoring that enable animal participants’ metacognitive confidence judgments about firstorder perceptual discriminations, in neither case does the second-order metacognitive
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comment suffice to establish the presence or absence of consciousness per se (Smith et al.,
2003). In the first part of the study, the inference that the monkey does not visually
experience the occluded stimuli depends not only on the negative metacognitive comment,
but also on the many homologies between monkey and human neurophysiology and
neuroanatomy, as well as on the fact that humans with similar cortical damage - such as the
cortically damaged patient G.Y. - verbally report the absence of visual experience
(Weiskrantz, 1998). In the second part, it was assumed that consciousness is grounded in
terms of metacognition, a position which confuses an epistemological strategy
(metacognitive monitoring) with its ontological reality (Seth et al., 2005b).
Furthermore, data drawn from studies using confidence rating and wagering methods
can also be contaminated by participants’ inattention and inconsistency as two non-optimal
strategies that serve to reduce observed sensitivity (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Recently,
the claim that PDW can directly measure subjective awareness has been challenged by
studies conducted based on the signal detection theoretic perspective (Green & Swets, 1966;
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). For instance, it was challenged whether economic conditions
interacted with participants’ confidence level, as well as whether this interaction influenced
awareness measure at all (Fleming & Dolan, 2010). Furthermore, interpreting PDW data is
potentially confounded by complex factors affecting how gains and losses affect
performance (Clifford et al., 2008). To conclude, PDW cannot directly measure subjective
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awareness because conscious content is ontologically subjective (Seth, 2008). There is no
single tool that can measure metacognition alone (Akturk & Sahin, 2011).
Clearly, the use of introspection, confidence rating, and PDW as metacognitive
measurement is just as common as the methodological attacks they arouse. Therefore, these
literatures of behavioral measures of metacognition and the criticisms against them are
presented above in order to contrast them with a different method used throughout the
following chapters.
2.17 Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman,
2005)
As a remedy to the criticisms (e.g., Fleming & Dolan, 2010) on response biases found
in behavioral research discussed before, recent cognitive psychologists have adopted Signal
Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) to study
participants’ sensory-perceptual sensitivity to behavioral response to stimuli. SDT is a
psychophysical model based on electronic engineering theory with foundations in
mathematical developments for theories of statistical inference, initially used to assess how
respondents accurately identify signals from noises (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The
Signal-Theoretic approach has recently been used as a methodological research tool to
measure participants’ sensitivity (Galvin et al., 2003; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). SDT’s
strength is that it can discriminate experimental participants’ bias (i.e., overconfidence) from
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their task sensitivity based on their behavioral responses to experimental stimuli. Sensitivity
in this case refers to the effectiveness whereby confidence ratings discriminate correct
responses/answers from incorrect ones (Maniscalco et al., 2016). In a standard SDT type-1
paradigm, each trial would give rise to four possible outcome categories based on task
stimuli and participants’ responses/answers, namely hits, false alarms (FAs), misses, and
correct rejections (CRs) (Maniscalco & Lau, 2014) as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1
Type-1 task outcomes
Stimulus

Response
“No”

“Yes”

Absent

Correction rejection

False alarm

Present

Miss

Hit

Consequently, a sensitivity parameter is computed by subtracting the transformed “hit” and
“false-alarm” rates, as illustrated below:
d’ (sensitivity) = z(H) – z(F)
In the context of confidence rating, the observer’s high confidence rating following a correct
response would then be categorized as a “hit” but a “FA” following an incorrect response, as
well as a “CR” for low confidence rating after an incorrect response but a “miss” after a
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correct response. Analyses of this type is referred to as Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity
(Clarke et al., 1959; Clifford et al., 2008; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
So far, the question currently concerned has been how best to measure accuracy. The
value of d’ has been defended on programmatic grounds, and it represents the difference
between the transformed hit and false-alarm rates, as well as provides a good description of
the relation between H and F when response bias varies (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The
first question concerned are what the measures imply about the process by which
discrimination takes place? Secondly, how are items represented internally, and how does the
participant decide on whether a particular item is Old (appeared earlier) or New (never
appeared)? SDT assumes that a participant in a memory experiment is judging a single
attribute known as familiarity, and that each stimulus presentation yields a value of such
decision variable. Repeated presentations do not always lead to the same result but generate
a distribution of values. On average, Old items are more familiar than New ones, otherwise
the participant would not be able to discriminate.
2.18 Meta-d’ Method (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012)
Similar to SDT type 1’s analysis covered above, for metacognitive reports, the
objective state of the physical world becomes the participant’s trial-by-trial task performance
(correct versus incorrect), while the subjective report is now a judgment of such performance
(Galvin et al., 2003). It is argued that type-2 measures are free from participants’ under- or
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over-confidence response bias discussed previously (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). SDT naturally
connects a process-level characterization of the relationship between type 1 and type 2 to
behavioral mesures, and that this relationship can be accounted for to provide bias-free
metacognitive measures (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Approximation of meta-d’ from the
lower and upper confidence criteria (i.e., k2− and k2+) can be empirically calculated as per the
standard method for deriving a criterion in SDT (Locke et al., 2020):

and

To compute meta-d’, Locke et al. (2020) used an average of two d’-like measurements from
the empirical upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively:

The concept behind computing a separate sensitivity parameter for confidence is that
additional noises may have been used for internal measures between Type 1 as well as Type
2 decisions (Maniscalco & Lau, 2016). In the standard SDT framework, the variances of the
distributions are fixed and thus the additional noise is modeled as a shift in distributions
means.
To conclude, meta-d’ is a signal detection theoretic measurement of metacognitive
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sensitivity, that quantifies the extent to which one’s confidence rating in a task tracks
performance (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). This method is claimed to be not confounded by
response bias and type 1 sensitivity. Ultimately, participants’ stimulus judgment accuracy can
be predicted by their confidence ratings. It was based upon SDT that metacognitive
sensitivity was quantified and measured in terms of the extent to which participants’
confidence rating tracks performance in a task (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).
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CHAPTER 3: CURRENT RESEARCH AIM

3.1. Research Objectives
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the current literature of cognitive and
rumination research has yet to answer the question of whether ruminators are self-aware of
their lack of positive memory bias. Therefore, to better understand factors that perpetuate
ruminators’ persistent thinking style, it is necessary to explore cognitive processing more
fully. The present research aim was threefold; first, it would be interesting to know if
rumination involves an awareness problem. Indeed, previous clinical studies show that
unawareness is associated with negative psychological consequences, including
schizophrenics’ poor illness insight with severer positive and negative symptoms (Mingrone
et al., 2013), diminished self-knowledge with higher anxiety and depression severity among
university students (Behjati et al., 2011), and lower awareness with higher levels of
posttraumatic stress symptom severity, psychiatric multimorbidity, anxious arousal, and
anhedonic depression symptoms among adults exposed to trauma (Bernstein et al., 2011).
Thus, while unawareness has been related to psychopathology, its relationship with
rumination is yet to be studied. For that reason, it is anticipated that there would be a
potential linkage between ruminators’ lower self-awareness and their greater level of
decrease in positive memory compared with non-ruminators. Specifically, self-awareness is
conceptualized as metacognition that refers to a secondary level mental processing with
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cognition – namely, negative memory bias - as its object (Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012) in
this research. Consequently, the present study examined metacognition associated with
rumination.
Secondly, given the response bias phenomenon identified in previous behavioral
measures of metacognition, this study specifically measured metacognitive sensitivity, the
extent to which one’s confidence tracks task performance, using the meta-d’ method
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Finally, given that trait rumination and sad mood state as two
characteristically distinctive psychological constructs are known to interact (Cooney et al.,
2010; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Mor & Dacches, 2015; Shull et al.,
2016; Zhou et al., 2020), it is deemed imperative to also evaluate both trait rumination and
sad mood state when examining the effects of lack of positive memory bias on cognitive
processes (Grant et al., 2019).
3.2 Research Questions
On the basis of the innovative-based meta-d’ approach, it was believed that ruminators’
metacognitive sensitivity can be objectively measured. As discussed, (lack of) positive
memory bias has been studied using directed-forgetting (e.g., Liang et al., 2011), the present
study also adopted this experimental paradigm. The advantage of using item-method
directed-forgetting is that it has been found effective for different memory processes, such as
recall and recognition tasks (Hauswald & Kissler, 2008). In three directed-forgetting memory
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experiments, the present research examined whether trait rumination (Experiment 1) and
mood state (Experiments 2 and 3) influenced metacognitive sensitivity, and if so, how and to
what extent. Since rumination is considered a stable individual factor (Mor & Winquist,
2002; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Whisman et al., 2020), Experiment 1 investigated
whether participants’ trait rumination – low vs. high rumination group - influenced
metacognitive sensitivity. Also, given that the interaction between trait rumination and sad
mood state has been consistently documented in the rumination literature (Grant et al., 2019;
Kirschbaum et al., 1993; Mor & Dacches, 2015; Zhou et al., 2020), Experiment 2 extended
Experiment 1 by further exploring the impact of the interaction between sad mood state and
trait rumination (i.e., state x trait interaction) – sad vs. neutral mood – on metacognitive
sensitivity. Finally, state rumination can also be induced by cognitive engagement in
ruminative task (Blackhart & Kline, 2005; Kuehner et al., 2009; Lyubomirsky & NolenHoeksema, 1993, 1995), thus Experiment 3 examined the impact of the interaction between a
ruminative state and trait rumination (i.e., state x trait interaction) – rumination-focused task
vs. distraction-focused task – on metacognitive sensitivity. Assuming that ruminators’ lack of
positive information bias is driven by reduced metacognitive sensitivity, the present research
aimed to address the following questions:
Research question 1: Is trait rumination negatively associated with memory sensitivity for
positive information in memory task?
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Research question 2: Is trait rumination negatively associated with metacognitive
sensitivity for positive information in memory task?
Research question 3: Do sad mood state and trait rumination interact (state x trait) to
influence metacognitive sensitivity of positive information for low and high ruminators
differently?
Research question 4: Do ruminating response and trait rumination interact (state x trait)
to influence metacognitive sensitivity of positive information for low and high ruminators
differently?
3.3 Experimental Paradigm
This study adopted the widely used item-method directed-forgetting paradigm
(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Taylor et al., 2018) developed specifically for memory bias
assessment. This experimental paradigm has been commonly adopted for metacognitive
research (Capan & Ikier, 2021; Foster, 2012; Foster & Sahakyan, 2012; Friedman & Castel,
2011; Sahakyan & Foster, 2016; Tekcan & Aktürk, 2001). During a series of memory task
trials, participants would study presented images of face or scenario cued as forget or
remember for a subsequent memory test. The memory task consisted of two phases, known
as study phase and test phase. During study phase, participants would be instructed to view a
series of brief images, each of which would be followed by either a “Remember” cue or a
“Forget” cue. Afterwards, participants would enter the test phase for memory testing via two-
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alternative forced-choice (2AFC) options. They would also be required to indicate
confidence rating for each response. As mentioned, the advantage of item-method directedforgetting is that it has been found effective for different memory processes, such as recall
and recognition tasks (Hauswald & Kissler, 2008).
3.4 Structure of the Present Research Project
The present research project consists of three experiments. In Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 x 2
(trait rumination x emotion valence x memory cue) design was used in which participants
were first measured on their trait rumination and then tested on affective memory via
performing a computer task. In Experiment 2, a new group of participants were recruited to
take part in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 experiment (trait rumination x emotion valence x memory cue x
mood state), in which they were measured on trait rumination and then underwent the same
experimental paradigm as that in stage one, with the additional manipulation of mood state
by means of mood induction. In Experiment 3, similarly, a new group of participants were
invited to a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 experiment (trait rumination x emotion valence x memory cue x
cognitive task), in which they were first measured on trait rumination again before
undergoing the same experimental paradigm as in previous stages, with the additional
manipulation of rumination as a state by means of assignment to either performing a
rumination-focused task or a distraction-focused task. As a screening procedure prior to the
three experiments, all the potential participants were measured on their depression level.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT ONE

4.1 Overview and Research Hypothesis
As it is important to explore the underlying cognitive mechanisms of rumination, its
secondary-level processing in terms of metacognition is assessed using psychophysical
technique to examine whether ruminators are associated with an unawareness of their
negative memory bias. Thus, Experiment 1’s purpose was to examine metacognition
associated with rumination in order to understand their relationship. Specifically, we
measured metacognitive sensitivity, the extent to which one’s confidence tracks directedforgetting task performance, using the meta-d’ method (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). The
objectives were to investigate the effect of directed-forgetting on rumination, and whether
higher trait rumination would be related to lower meta-d’ level. Thus, this was a Trait (low
vs. high) x Valence (negative vs. positive) x Cue (forget vs. remember) designed experiment.
Assuming that rumination is associated with decreased positive memory retrieval due to lack
of positive memory bias, ruminators would be expected to recall less positive images and
result in performing worse than non-ruminators in general. Thus, it was hypothesized that:
H1: High ruminators’ memory sensitivity would be lower for positive images than low
ruminators in memory task.
Moreover, assuming that lack of positive information bias is driven by reduced
metacognitive sensitivity, high ruminators’ metacognitive performance would be worse for
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positive images than non-ruminators. It was consequently hypothesized that:
H2: High ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity would be lower for positive images than
low ruminators in memory task.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
Convenient sampling was used from the researcher student’s network, including family
members, relatives, ex-colleagues, friends, and their networks. A total of 60 (30 males, 50%)
participants volunteered to take part. Participants whose depression score exceeded the cutoff of 21 (Lo et al., 2012) would be excluded from the present experiment to prevent
depression severity from confounding the results. This research project was approved by the
Lingnan University ethics committee.
4.2.2 Materials
4.2.2.1 Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
For screening, the brief 21-item version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
(DASS-21) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) was used: A self-report measure of one-week state
negative affect, developed specifically for achieving maximal differentiation between
affective syndromes of depression, anxiety and tension/stress. Respondents indicate the
extent to which they experienced each of the symptoms depicted in the items during the
previous week on a 4-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3
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(applied to me very much, or most of the time). The 21-item version was developed by
selecting the highest loading items from each scale of the original 42-item version of the
DASS, while also aiming to retain coverage of the full symptom content of each of the three
affective states (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Higher DASS scores in each of the three
subscales indicate more severity in respective variables. Example items include: “I couldn’t
seem to experience any positive feeling at all” (depression), “I was aware of dryness of my
mouth” (anxiety), and “I found it hard to wind down” (stress). DASS-21 is widely used for
its good reliability and validity. Reliability analysis showed high internal consistencies for
DASS-Depression subscale (Cronbach’s α = .90) with current sample.
4.2.2.2 Rumination Response Scale (RRS)
The ruminative response scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was developed to
assess individual tendency to ruminate in response to a depressed mood. RRS consists of 22items rated by a 4-point-Likert self-report scale, ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost
always); Example items include: “Think about how alone you feel”, “Think about how
passive and unmotivated you feel”, and “Analyze recent events to try to understand why you
are depressed”; participants scoring high are associated with high levels of ruminative
tendency. RRS has good reliability as well as validity (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Whisman et
al., 2020). For current sample, reliability analysis showed high internal consistencies for
RRS (Cronbach’s α = .89).
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4.2.3 Experimental stimuli
A total of 240 images were selected from an internet source known as the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) database (Gruhn & Scheibe, 2008). These selected images
were categorized into two groups (120 images in each group) according to their normative
ratings (Lang et al., 2005). Image grouping was based on each image’s numerical identity for
naming in the IAPS database. Image selection was based on two criteria: (1) Images that
consisted of mutilation and erotic pictures were excluded, as they were deemed inappropriate
for this study. (2) Images with arousal mean higher than 5.9 were not included, as
participants were not expected to remember the images only due to high arousal or
disturbance. While the IAPS database originally included valence ratings ranging between
point 1 (negative-valence) and point 9 (positive-valence) scale, an Independent-Sample TTest was performed to ensure means of valence for negative (M = 3.46, SD = 0.71) and
positive (M = 6.67, SD = 0.95) sets were significantly different (p < .01), while mean arousal
levels of the negative (M = 4.53, SD = 0.74) and positive (M = 4.52, SD = 0.76) sets were not
significantly different (p = 0.87). All images were transformed (using PhotoshopTM v8.0
software) based on 640 x 480 pixels (by changing the size of the picture) from their original
sizes.
Prior to data collection, software package jsPsych (De Leeuw, 2015) was used to
randomly divide 120 positive- and 120 negative-valence images into four subsets, namely
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positive-remember, positive-forget, negative-remember, and negative-forget (thus 30 images
assigned to each condition). In this way, each positive- and negative-valence item could be
equally presented. Randomization was performed anew before each participant, such that
stimulus combinations could be ensured across all four experimental conditions. We used
pictorial stimuli rather than words for participants’ easier processing, as the latter would
require a certain level of language reading ability.
4.2.4 Procedure
After obtaining informed consent, participants were administered with questionnaires
that included DASS and RRS. During the task they were seated in a stationary chair from a
24-inch computer screen where stimuli appeared. Standard keyboard, mouse, and stereo
headphones were attached to the computer for use. The task consisted of two phases, viz.,
study phase and test phase. During study phase, participants were told to view a series of
brief images beginning with a small “+” at the screen center, and that each image that
subtended 1◦ of visual angle (VA) would be followed by either “Remember” or “Forget”.
They were asked to follow through by trying best to remember or forget the image that has
just disappeared accordingly. The experiment was based on item-method directed-forgetting
paradigm (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Taylor et al., 2018), in which participants study
face or scenario images (in either positive- or negative-valence) one at a time for 1000ms.
Each item was followed by either a “forget” or “remember” cue for 1500ms, and then a cross
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(+) for fixation purposes would be shown in the center of a computer monitor for
randomized durations of 1000ms, 1250ms 1500ms, 1750ms, and 2000ms as conventionally
designed (Hall et al., 2021).
After 120 trials of image presentation in total (approximately 8 minutes as timed by
researcher), participants were asked to solve a few simple mathematical problems by
entering answers in a text box. Arithmetic problems served as distractor to prevent
participants from recency effect (i.e., recalling the last few presented items very well)
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1993). Following 4 arithmetic questions, participants entered test phase
in which memory for seen items were tested via two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) on
120 trials. They were informed that in each of the following trials two images would be
presented side by side, and that they needed to choose which one had appeared during
previous study phase (i.e., which one they thought was old), regardless of study cue.
Participants were also required to indicate how confident they felt with each answer, by
choosing one among four buttons indicating different confidence ratings, ranging from 1
(guess only) to 4 (extremely confident) on either left-hand or right-hand side that
corresponded to the image they chose. Using a 4-point Likert scale to indicate confidence
rating is thought to be the easiest number of categories to be used in experiments (Irvine,
2012). All randomization, presentation, and recording of responses of experimental trials
were performed by jsPsych. Participants were debriefed at the end of experiment. A
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summary flowchart of trials and stimulus displays using item-method directed-forgetting
memory task was presented in Figure 1.
Study phase

+

Test phase

+

1,000ms

Which image have
you seen before?

1,000ms

Remember

+

+

1,500ms

2,000ms

Which image have
you seen before?

Forget

(57-38) x 10 = ?

Continue

Figure 1. A summary flowchart of trials and stimulus displays using item-method directed-
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forgetting memory task.

4.2.5 Data processing
A within-participants (Valence: negative vs. positive, Cue: forget vs. remember) and
between-participants (Group: low rumination vs. high rumination) mixed ANOVA design
was adopted using IBM SPSS 23 software for Windows (www.ibm.com/spss). Memory
sensitivity [d’ = z(hit rate) - z(false alarm rate)] was assessed for recognition task using
standard SDT methods (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In this study d’ was preferred
because of its adjustment for the unequal variances of the internal response distributions for
the target (e.g., new images that have not appeared previously) and noise (e.g., previously
presented images that are recognized as new) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). To examine
metacognitive sensitivity in the recognition task, individual meta-d’ level was calculated for
each response type (i.e., negative-forget images, negative-remember images, positive-forget
images, and positive-remember images), thus quantifying how participants’ confidence
ratings accurately tracked memory performance over trials (Maniscalco & Lau, 2014) with a
code implemented in MATLAB
(http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/fit_rs_meta_d_MLE.m).
For type-2 sensitivity analyses, mean differences among various experimental
conditions at the metacognition level was examined. Confidence rating and metacognitive
sensitivity that was measured as response-specific meta-d’ for the response of judging a
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previously shown image as old (Maniscalco & Lau, 2014) were analyzed. Although meta-d’
measures metacognitive sensitivity independently from type-1 sensitivity (d’), meta-d’ is
calculated on identical scale as d’, enabling an intuitive interpretation of meta-d’ in relation
to d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Reliability and correlation analyses
Pearson correlation indicated strong correlation between DASS-Depression subscale
and RRS (r = .72, p < .001), consistent with the literature (Joormann et al., 2011; Whisman
et al., 2020).
4.3.2 Group characteristics
There were 30 participants in low and high rumination groups respectively, after
median-split method (RRS median = 40.5) (De Lissnyder & Koster, 2012; Koster et al.,
2013). Current sample size (n = 60) was considered acceptable in comparison with previous
directed-forgetting metacognitive studies, such as Friedman and Castel (2011)’s which
recruited only 32 + 32 samples for two separate experiments, as well as Lee and Hsu
(2013)’s with 50 + 32 + 56 + 32 samples for four separate experiments. Both groups did not
differ significantly in age, t(58) =.24, two-tailed p > .05, while differed significantly in
depression score, t(58) = 7.55, two-tailed p < .001, as well as in RRS score, t(58) = 13.51,
two-tailed p < .001, as expected (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Baseline comparison between low and high ruminators: Experiment 1
N

Age (years)

RRS

DASS

Group

Male

Female

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Low

14

16

34.9

9.7

34.8

4.4

9.8

3.3

High

16

14

35.4

6.0

52.4

5.6

16.3

3.4

Note. RRS = Ruminative Response Scale. DASS = only the depression domain of the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale was employed. Low and high rumination scores represent the
lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split = 40.5.

4.3.3 Type-1 sensitivity analyses
4.3.3.1 Memory sensitivity (d’)
First, memory sensitivity, d’, was analyzed in all four memory task conditions (i.e.,
negative-forget images, negative-remember images, positive-forget images, and positiveremember images). A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue
(forget, remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) as a between-participants variable was conducted. This analysis yielded a
significant main effect for Cue, [F(1, 58) = 32.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .36], whereby on
average participants accurately recalled more (i.e., achieved more hit rates as a result of
higher memorial sensitivity) remember-images (M = 1.83, SE = .12; 95% CI, 1.58 – 2.07)
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than forget-images (M = 1.48, SE = .12; 95% CI, 1.25 – 1.71), t(59) = 5.47, two-tailed p
< .001, thus observing directed-forgetting effect as in line with the literature (Block, 2009;
Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). Furthermore, interaction effect between Cue and
Group, [F(1, 58) = 5.46, p = .023, partial η2 = .09], was observed after Bonferroni
corrections (Armstrong, 2014). Follow-up t-tests indicated that decrease of d’ from
remember-images (M = 1.83, SE = .18) to forget-images (M = 1.62, SE = .18) was significant
for low ruminators, t(29) = 2.63, two-tailed p = .014. For high ruminators, decrease of d’
from remember-images (M = 1.82, SE = .17) to forget-images (M = 1.33, SE = .15) was also
significant, t(29) = 5.18, two-tailed p < .001 (Figure 2). However, the hypothesized
interaction effect between Group and Valence whereby high ruminators’ memory sensitivity
would be lower for positive images was not significant, [F(1, 58) = 1.99, p = .163, partial η2
= .03] (H1 was rejected).
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Figure 2. Means of memory sensitivity (d’) as function of rumination scores and cue:
Experiment 1. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on
RRS based on median-split.

4.3.3.2 Response time
To investigate participants’ response time, analysis with response time as the dependent
variable was rerun in a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue
(forget, remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) as a between-participants variable. This analysis yielded main effect for Cue,
[F(1, 58) = 27.20, p < .001, partial η2 = .32], after Bonferroni corrections, indicating that on
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average participants responded faster to remember-images (M = 3093.15ms, SE = 102.94ms;
95% CI, 2887.10 – 3299.20) than forget-images (M = 3405.84ms, SE = 115.42ms; 95% CI,
3174.81 – 3636.87), t(59) = 5.26, two-tailed p < .001, as expected. Other main/interaction
effects were non-significant.
4.3.4 Type-2 sensitivity analyses
4.3.4.1 Confidence rating
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) as a between-participants variable was conducted on confidence rating. This
analysis yielded main effect for Valence, [F(1, 58) = 17.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .23], after
Bonferroni corrections, showing that confidence rating was higher when participants
attended to negative-valence images (M = 2.97, SE = .07; 95% CI, 2.82 – 3.11) than to
positive-valence image (M = 2.87, SE = .08; 95% CI, 2.71 – 3.03), t(59) = 3.98, two-tailed p
< .001. Secondly, main effect for Cue, [F(1, 58) = 47.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .45], was
observed, indicating directed-forgetting effect whereby participants were more confident
with remember-images (M = 3.05, SE = .08; 95% CI, 2.90 – 3.21) than with forget-images
(M = 2.78, SE = .08; 95% CI, 2.63 – 2.93), t(59) = 6.83, two-tailed p < .001. Also, main
between-participants effect for Group, [F(1, 58) = 8.28, p = .006, partial η2 = .13], was
observed, indicating that low ruminators (M = 3.13, SE = .11; 95% CI, 2.92 – 3.34) were
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significantly more confident than high ruminators (M = 2.70, SE = .11; 95% CI, 2.49 – 2.91).
Importantly, such analysis indicated interaction effect between Valence and Group,
[F(1, 58) = 6.00, p = .017, partial η2 = .09], after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests
indicated that confidence rating means of negative-valence image between low (M = 3.15,
SE = .10) and high ruminators (M = 2.78, SE = .10) differed significantly, t(58) = 2.57, twotailed p = .013, as did confidence rating means of positive-valence image between low (M =
3.11, SE = .11) and high ruminators (M = 2.62, SE = .11), t(58) = 3.10, two-tailed p = .003.
The decrease of confidence rating from negative (M = 2.78, SE = .10) to positive-valence
image (M = 2.62, SE = .11) was significant for high ruminators, t(29) = 4.58, two-tailed p
< .001, but not for low ruminators, t(29) = 1.22, two-tailed p = .231 (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Means of participants’ confidence rating as function of rumination scores and
image valence: Experiment 1. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and
higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

4.3.4.2 Metacognitive sensitivity (Meta-d’)
Regarding participants’ meta-d’ level in the memory task as my main dependent
variable being explored, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and
Cue (TBF, TBR) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) as a between-participants variable was conducted. This analysis indicated
interaction effect between Cue and Group, [F(1, 58) = 8.75, p = .004, partial η2 = .13], after
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Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that the means of meta-d’ level of TBF
image between low ruminators (M = 1.67, SE = .17) and high ruminators (M = 1.28, SE
= .13) differed significantly, t(58) = 1.88, two-tailed p = .065 (marginal), but not the means
of meta-d’ level of TBR image between the groups, t(58) = 1.21, two-tailed p = .232. Low
ruminators’ decrease in meta-d’ level from TBF image to TBR image was not significant,
t(29) = 1.58, two-tailed p = .126, while in contrast high ruminators’ increase in meta-d’ level
from TBF image (M = 1.28, SE = .13) to TBR image (M = 1.69, SE = .18), was significant,
t(29) = 3.34, two-tailed p = .002 (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Means of meta-d’ as function of rumination scores and cue: Experiment 1. Low
and high rumination scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on
median-split.

4.3.4.3 Value of difference between meta-d’ and d’ (meta-d’ – d’)
For the key dependent variable, meta-d’ level, we initially obtained meta-d’ fits for
each participant via a code implemented in MATLAB. To consider how participants’ type-1
performance affects their type-2 data, however, all meta-d’ fits needed to be further
evaluated with respect to d’ fits. Therefore, the value of difference between type-2 sensitivity
(meta-d’) and type-1 sensitivity (d’) was taken as the dependent variable (Meta-d’ – d’) in
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order to reflect more accurate data on metacognitive sensitivity, by controlling for
participants’ memory performance on their metacognitive performance as suggested in the
literature (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Consequently, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence
(negative, positive) and Cue (forget, remember) as within-participants variables, as well as
Group (low rumination, high rumination) as a between-participants variable was conducted
on the meta-d’ – d’ value. This analysis yielded an interaction effect between Valence and
Group, [F(1, 58) = 4.72, p = .034, partial η2 = .08], after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up ttests indicated that while mean difference between meta-d’ – d’ values of negative- and
positive-valence images was non-significant for low ruminators, t(29) = .79, two-tailed p
= .438, mean of meta-d’ – d’ value of positive-valence image (M = -.31, SE = .16) was
significantly lower, t(29) = 2.48, two-tailed p = .019, than that of negative-valence image (M
= .13, SE = .15) for high ruminators. Moreover, mean of meta-d’ – d’ value of negativevalence images for high ruminators (M = .13, SE = .15) was significantly higher, t(58) =
2.16, two-tailed p = .035, than that for low ruminators (M = -.32, SE = .15) (Figure 5).
Therefore, the second hypothesis that high ruminators would display lower meta-d’ level for
positive images was supported. Summary of findings in Experiment 1 can be found in
Appendix A
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Figure 5. Means (+SEM) of difference between meta-d’ and d’ as function of rumination
scores and valence: Experiment 1. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and
higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

4.4 Summary
Type-1 and type-2 analyses of Experiment 1 have provided both significant and
insignificant results that help us understand the cognitive processes of rumination from the
primary-level processing and secondary-level processing.
Type-1 result showed a non-significant interaction effect between trait rumination and
image valence on memory sensitivity, thus not supporting the first hypothesis that high
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ruminators’ d’ level would be lower for positive images. This is inconsistent with the
prediction that low ruminators will have difficulty forgetting positive images, namely having
higher “hit” rate than “false alarm” rate (i.e., greater d’ level) for positive images, whereas
high ruminators will not. This finding suggests that rumination is not related to lower
memory sensitivity for positive information. Specifically, (lacking) positive memory bias or
low positive affect characteristic of ruminators (Clark & Watson, 1991; Emery et al., 2020)
and (lower) positive memory sensitivity are two distinct mechanisms that might involve
different cognitive processes.
Experiment 1’s type-2 result supported the hypothesized interaction effect between trait
rumination and image valence (Trait x Valence), that ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity
(as measured in terms of the value of difference between meta-d’ and d’, viz., meta-d’ – d’)
is lower for positive images relative to low ruminators. This association between rumination
and reduced metacognitive processing of positive-images suggests that, when ruminators
attempt to retrieve positive memories, the ability to track them accurately via confidence
reduces significantly. Ruminators appear to be less aware of the positive aspects of past
experiences. Namely, ruminators do not know whether they know or do not know – they
have inaccurate/poor metacognition – in the domain of positive memory. This significant
finding is in line with the literature documenting ruminators’ lack of positive memory bias
that is displayed by non-ruminators (Clark & Watson, 1991; Diener & Emmons, 1985; Grant

70

et al., 2019; Liang et al., 2011). In this sense, lacking positive memory bias is associated with
deficient metacognition of positive memory.
In general, type-1 level results corresponded to the directed-forgetting literature
(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Fawcett & Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2018), namely
participants performed better (i.e., achieved higher hit rates) and responded faster for
remember-images regardless of rumination level, thus replicating previous findings (Block,
2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). Also, the observed interaction between study
cue and rumination group indicated that both low and high ruminators’ memory sensitivity
decreased significantly when being instructed to forget. In regard to the type-2 metacognitive
level, rumination was found to be negatively correlated to confidence, thus replicating a
previously found association between ruminators and low confidence in planning (Ward et
al., 2003). Main effects of emotion valence and memory cue showed that confidence was
significantly higher when participants attended to negative-valence and to to-be-remembered
images, respectively. Main between-participants effect for rumination group indicated that
low ruminators were significantly more confident than high ruminators. The observed
interaction effect between study cue and rumination group also indicated that while high
ruminators’ confidence for both negative and positive images was significantly lower than
that of low ruminators’, their confidence decreased significantly from negative to positive
images.
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To summarize, Experiment 1’s results show that high ruminators’ metacognitive
sensitivity (but not memory sensitivity) would be lower for positive images than low
ruminators in memory task, suggesting that lacking positive memory bias is associated with
deficient metacognition of positive memory. Despite these observations, it is possible that
the present effects and interactions occur only in an unchanged mood state with rumination
being measured as an individual trait (e.g., Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Davis, 1999; Whisman et al., 2020). Therefore, to see whether the current results can be
extended and generalized across different mood states, Experiment 2 was conducted for
exploring further impacts of trait rumination and sad mood state – namely their interaction
effect – on metacognitive sensitivity.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT TWO

5.1 Overview and Research Hypothesis
Results of Experiment 1 indicated that ruminators are metacognitively less sensitive to
their positive memory; ruminators have poorer metacognition of positive information. Given
that sad mood state has been shown to interact with trait rumination (Grant et al., 2019;
Kirschbaum et al., 1993; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Mor & Dacches,
2015; Shull et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2020), Experiment 2 was conducted to replicate and
extend Experiment 1’s findings using standardized mood inductions. Experimental mood
induction is commonly used by which participants’ mood states are manipulated prior to
performing cognitive tasks, such that the effect of mood changes on the relationship between
rumination and cognitive processing (e.g., executive functioning) can be examined (Watkins
& Brown, 2002; Watkins & Mason, 2002; Westermann et al., 1996, meta-analysis). For
instance, during sad mood high ruminators have been shown to consume more neuronal
resources to switch emotional materials (Lo et al., 2012). The question of whether the
previously observed effects of study cue, emotion valence, and rumination would remain or
change under different mood states were yet to be explored. As suggested (Grant et al.,
2019), we need to evaluate the interaction between sad mood state and trait rumination for
examining the effects of negative memory bias on cognitive processes. Consequently,
Experiment 2 aimed to investigate whether interaction between sad mood state and trait
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rumination (state x trait) would influence meta-d’ level for low and high ruminators
differently. Experimental design was State (sad vs. neutral) x Trait (low vs. high) x Valence
(negative vs. positive) x Cue (forget vs. remember). Given that rumination is associated with
decreased positive memory retrieval (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), which is also found to be
triggered by sad mood state (Grant et al., 2019), the expected interaction effects were
hypothesized to test both the effect of sad mood state and interaction between sad mood state
and trait rumination separately, as follows:
H1: Exposure to a sad-mood induction would result in lower memory sensitivity for
positive images than exposure to a neutral-mood induction.
H2: Participants with higher trait rumination would demonstrate lower memory sensitivity
for positive images in response to the sad-mood induction than the neutral condition.
Secondly, assuming that lack of positive information bias is driven by reduced metacognitive
sensitivity, high ruminators’ lower metacognitive sensitivity for positive images would be
further decreased by sad mood state. Thus, it was hypothesized that:
H3: Exposure to a sad-mood induction would result in lower metacognitive sensitivity for
positive images than exposure to a neutral-mood induction.
H4: Participants with higher trait rumination would demonstrate lower metacognitive
sensitivity for positive images in response to the sad-mood induction than the neutral
condition.
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5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Introductory Psychology students from Lingnan University participated in this
experiment. Exclusion criteria were similar to those in Experiment 1. After exclusion of 2
participants for overall chance performance in the memory test phase, and 1 participant for
memory task incompletion, the final sample consisted of 60 participants (19 males, 31.7%)
who took part and received course credits.
5.2.2 Materials
Besides identical scales and experimental stimuli to those in Experiment 1, visual
analogue scale (VAS), an often-used measure in epidemiologic and clinical research to rate
individuals’ subjective feelings (Bond & Lader, 1974; Paul-Dauphin et al., 1999), was
administered. Two pieces of classical music, namely “Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke”
composed by Prokofiev for sad- mood induction, and “Chopin Waltzes nos. 11 and 12” for
neutral-mood induction, were extracted into 10-minute-long versions for use. They have
been shown to be effective in terms of temporary inducing mood in previous studies
(Badcock & Allen, 2003; Lo et al., 2012; Wood et al., 1990).
5.2.3 Procedure
Experimental procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1, except that mood
induction was employed in counterbalanced order between screening and the memory task.
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Participants in sad-mood condition were exposed to negative mood induction by being asked
to listen to the sad music piece and simultaneously try best to put themselves into a sad or
depressed mood. For participants in neutral-mood condition, the neutral music piece was
used following similar instruction. Duration was approximately 10-minute long. To ensure
effectiveness of mood induction, participants’ mood state was measured both before and
after listening to music piece using visual analogue scale (VAS). Participants subsequently
underwent the study phase and then test phase of the directed-forgetting memory task.
Debriefing was given at the end of experiment.
5.2.4 Data processing
Experiment 2 was based on a trait-by-state design. A within-participants (Valence:
negative vs. positive, Cue: forget vs. remember) and between-participants (Group: low
rumination vs. high rumination, Mood: neutral vs. sad) mixed ANOVA design was adopted.
Identical to Experiment 1, memory sensitivity [d’ = z(hit rate) - z(false alarm rate)] was
assessed for the recognition task. Based on this, metacognitive sensitivity (as calculated by
meta-d’) was then assessed for each response type (i.e., negative-forget images, negativeremember images, positive-forget images, and positive-remember images) following similar
procedure to that in Experimental 1. The aims were to replicate Experiment 1’s finding and
test for interaction between trait rumination and mood state on participants’ meta-d’ level.

76

5.3 Results
5.3.1 Reliability and correlation analyses
Reliability analysis showed high internal consistencies for both DASS-Depression
subscale (Cronbach’s α = .84) and RRS (Cronbach’s α = .90) with current sample. Pearson
correlation indicated a strong correlation between DASS and RRS (r = .58, p < .001), as
similarly shown in Experiment 1 following the literature (Joormann et al., 2011; Whisman et
al., 2020).
5.3.2 Group characteristics
There were 30 participants in low and high rumination groups respectively, after
median-split (RRS median = 49) (De Lissnyder & Koster, 2012; Koster et al., 2013).
Current sample size (n = 60) was considered acceptable in comparison with previous
directed-forgetting metacognitive studies (e.g., Friedman & Castel, 2011; Lee & Hsu, 2013).
Both groups did not significantly differ in age, t(58) =.10, two-tailed p > .05, while differed
significantly in depression score, t(58) = 2.52, two-tailed p = .015, as well as in RRS score,
t(58) = 10.99, two-tailed p < .001, as expected (see Table 3).
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Table 3
Baseline comparison between low and high ruminators: Experiment 2
N

Age (years)

RRS

DASS

Group

Male

Female

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Low

9

21

19.2

1.4

41.5

5.6

12.2

3.4

High

10

20

19.2

1.3

59.9

7.3

14.8

4.4

Note. RRS = Ruminative Response Scale. DASS = only the depression domain of the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale was employed. Low and high rumination scores represent the
lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split = 49.

5.3.3 Mood manipulation effect
Thirty-one participants (8 males and 23 females) were randomly assigned to neutral
mood condition and 29 participants (11 males and 18 females) assigned to sad mood
condition. Numbers of participants across the two mood conditions were imbalanced since
most of the students from the Psychology introductory course were female. Subsequently, a
Chi-square test of independence was conducted and results showed no significant association
between gender and mood condition, X2 (1, N = 60) = 1.0, p = .313. No difference in relation
to age, [F(1, 58) = .70, p > .05], or RRS scores, [F(1, 58) = .36, p > .05], was observed
across the two mood conditions. For comparing change of VAS mood dimensions prior to
and post-mood induction procedures, two Paired-Samples T-Tests on sad-mood and neutralmood participants regarding VAS-happiness, VAS-sadness, and VAS-arousal dimensions
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were performed, respectively. For neutral-mood condition, there were no significant mean
differences between the two time points in VAS-happiness, t(30) =.22, two-tailed p > .05,
VAS-sadness, t(30) = .75, two-tailed p > .05, and VAS-arousal, t(30) =.29, two-tailed p > .05
(Figure 6). For sad-mood condition, there was a significant decrease from time point 1
(before mood induction; M = 53.9, SD = 16.7) to time point 2 (after mood induction; M =
34.1, SD = 17.0) in VAS-happiness, t(28) = 6.37, two-tailed p < .001; a significant increase
in from time point 1 (before mood induction; M = 29.8, SD = 21.1) to time point 2 (after
mood induction; M = 70.0, SD = 19.6) in VAS-sadness, t(28) = 7.87, two-tailed p < .001,
while no significant mean difference was observed between time point 1 (before mood
induction; M = 40.8, SD = 19.1) and time point 2 (after mood induction; M = 42.9, SD =
18.8) in VAS-arousal, t(28) = .61, two-tailed p > .05 (Figure 6). In addition, a 2 x 2 x 2
mixed ANOVA with Time Point (before, after mood induction) x VAS dimension (happiness,
sadness, arousal) as within-participants variables and Mood (sad, neutral) as betweenparticipants variable was also conducted. Results indicated a significant interaction among
Time Point, VAS dimension, and Mood, [F(1, 58) = 27.89, p < .001, partial η2 = .33], was
observed after Bonferroni corrections. To conclude, sad-mood participants indicated lower
happiness level and higher sadness level compared with neutral-mood participants, while
arousal scores did not differ significantly for everyone after mood induction.
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Figure 6. Means (+SD) of VAS score as function of measure time point and VAS
dimensions in each mood condition: Experiment 2. T1 = mood measured before mood
induction. T2 = mood measured after mood induction. Low and high rumination scores
represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

5.3.4 Type-1 sensitivity analyses
5.3.4.1 Memory sensitivity (d’)
As in Experiment 1, participants’ memory sensitivity, d’, was analyzed in all
recognition task conditions. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive)
and Cue (forget, remember) as within-participants factors, as well as Group (low rumination,
high rumination) and Mood (sad, neutral) as between-participants factors was conducted.
This analysis yielded a significant main effect for Cue, [F(1, 56) = 19.03, p < .001, partial η2
= .25], showing that d’ was higher for remember-images (M = 2.47, SE = .11) than for
forget-images (M = 2.09, SE = .09), thus replicating Experiment 1’s and past results in
observing directed-forgetting effect (Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). A
significant main effect was also observed for Valence, [F(1, 56) = 4.61, p = .036, partial η2
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= .08], whereby memory sensitivity was overall higher when attending to negative-valence
images (M = 2.36, SE = .10) than to positive-valence images (M = 2.19, SE = .10).
Furthermore, interaction effect among Cue, Group, and Mood, [F(1, 56) = 5.53, p = .022,
partial η2 = .09], was found after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that
decrease of d’ from remember-images (M = 2.52, SE = .21) to forget-images (M = 1.89, SE
= .18) was significant for high ruminators, t(15) = 3.98, two-tailed p = .001, but not for low
ruminators, t(14) = .94, two-tailed p = .364, in neutral-mood condition (Figure 7).
Conversely, decrease of d’ from remember-images (M = 2.71, SE = .22) to forget-images (M
= 2.17, SE = .19) was significant for low ruminators, t(14) = 3.15, two-tailed p = .007, but
not for high ruminators, t(13) = .97, two-tailed p = .350, in sad-mood condition (Figure 7).
Since no interaction effects were observed among Valence, Group, and Mood, both H1 and
H2 were rejected. Other main/interaction effects were non-significant.

Figure 7. Means of d’ as function of rumination scores and study cue in each mood
condition: Experiment 2. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and higher
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percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

5.3.4.2 Response time
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) and Mood (sad, neutral) as between-participants variables was conducted. This
analysis yielded main effect for Valence, [F(1, 56) = 4.02, p = .050, partial η2 = .07], and
main effect for Cue, [F(1, 56) = 36.23, p < .001, partial η2 = .39], after Bonferroni
corrections. Results indicated that overall participants responded faster to negative-valence
images (M = 2669.78ms, SE = 83.83ms; 95% CI, 2501.86 – 2837.70) than to positivevalence images (M = 2745.51ms, SE = 95.47ms; 95% CI, 2554.27 – 2936.76); and faster to
remember-images (M = 2581.45ms, SE = 80.64ms; 95% CI, 2419.92 – 2742.99) than to
forget-images (M = 2833.84ms, SE = 99.02ms; 95% CI, 2635.48 – 3032.19). Other
main/interaction effects were non-significant.
5.3.5 Type-2 sensitivity analyses
Similar to Experiment 1, mean differences among the various experimental conditions
at the level of metacognition were examined:
5.3.5.1 Confidence rating
First, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
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remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) and Mood (sad, neutral) as between-participants variables was conducted on
confidence rating. This analysis yielded main effect for Valence, [F(1, 56) = 13.20, p = .001,
partial η2 = .19], after Bonferroni corrections, showing that confidence rating was higher for
negative-valence images (M = 3.08, SE = .07) than for positive-valence images (M = 2.99,
SE = .07). Also, main effect for Cue, [F(1, 56) = 39.71, p < .001, partial η2 = .42], was
observed, whereby confidence rating was higher for remember-mages (M = 3.14, SE = .07)
than for forget-images (M = 2.92, SE = .07). However, unlike Experiment 1’s findings, all
current interaction effects were non-significant.
5.3.5.2 Metacognitive sensitivity (Meta-d’)
Participants’ meta-d’ level as the main dependent variable in Experiment 2 was
examined prior to subsequent analyses. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence
(negative, positive) and Cue (TBF, TBR) as within-participants factors, as well as Group
(low rumination, high rumination) and Mood (sad, neutral) as between-participants factors
was conducted. This analysis indicated a significant main effect for Cue, [F(1, 56) = 14.91, p
< .001, partial η2 = .21]. Follow-up comparisons indicated that each pairwise difference was
also significant, p < .001. Meta-d’ was significantly higher for TBR (M = 2.29, SE = .10;
95% CI, 2.08 – 2.49) than for TBF (M = 1.83, SE = .12; 95% CI, 1.60 – 2.06) images when
averaged, suggesting that overall participants’ metacognitive sensitivity was higher (i.e.,
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confidence rating better tracked recognition accuracy) for TBR images. A main betweenparticipants effect for Group, [F(1, 56) = 7.35, p = .009, partial η2 = .12], was also observed,
indicating that low ruminators generally had higher meta-d’ levels (M = 2.30, SE = .13; 95%
CI, 2.05 – 2.56) than high ruminators did (M = 1.81, SE = .13; 95% CI, 1.55 – 2.07). Further,
a significant interaction between Valence and Group, [F(1, 56) = 4.78, p = .033, partial η2
= .08], was observed after Bonferroni corrections, whereby high ruminators showed a larger
difference in meta-d’ level between negative and positive valence images (Mnegative = 2.02, SE
= .18; Mpositive = 1.60, SE = .14) than low ruminators did (Mnegative = 2.22, SE = .18; Mpositive =
2.38, SE = .14). More importantly, a significant interaction among Valence, Group, and
Mood, [F(1, 56) = 4.92, p = .031, partial η2 = .08], was observed after Bonferroni
corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that while no main effects/interactions existed in
neutral-mood condition (all ps > .05) (Figure 8), the mean of meta-d’ – d’ value of positivevalence images for high ruminators (M = 1.36, SE = .22) was significantly lower, t(27) =
4.28, two-tailed p < .001, relative to low ruminators (M = 2.45, SE = .14) in sad-mood
condition (Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Means of meta-d’ as function of rumination scores and study cue in each mood
condition: Experiment 2. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and higher
percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

5.3.5.3 Value of difference between meta-d’ and d’ (meta-d’ – d’)
As in Experiment 1, analysis of meta-d’ – d’ value was preferred over meta-d’ level. A
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget, remember) as
within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high rumination) and Mood
(sad, neutral) as between-participants variables was conducted. This analysis indicated a
main between-subjects effect for Group, [F(1, 56) = 4.72, p = .034, partial η2 = .08], whereby
low ruminators generally had a greater meta-d’ – d’ value (M = -.03, SE = .12) relative to
high ruminators (M = -.41, SE = .12), as assumed. Since no significant interaction effect was
observed between Mood and Valence, [F(1, 56) = .31, p = .580, partial η2 = .01], the
hypothesis that decrease of meta-d’ level for positive images is only driven by sad-mood
induction could not be supported (H3 was rejected). More importantly, the interaction effect
among Valence, Group, and Mood, [F(1, 56) = 5.92, p = .018, partial η2 = .10], was observed
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after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that while no main
effects/interactions existed in neutral-mood condition (all ps > .05) (Figure 9), the mean of
meta-d’ – d’ value of positive-valence images for high ruminators (M = -.82, SE = .21) was
significantly lower, t(27) = 2.84, two-tailed p = .008, relative to low ruminators (M = .12, SE
= .21) in sad-mood condition, as hypothesized (H4 was supported). Also, low ruminators’
mean of meta-d’ – d’ value of positive-valence images increased significantly (Mnegative =
-.46, SE = .26; Mpositive = .12, SE = .21), t(14) = 2.58, two-tailed p = .022 (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Means (+SEM) of difference between meta-d’ and d’ as function of rumination
scores and image valence in each mood condition: Experiment 2. Low and high rumination
scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

5.3.5.4 Additional analyses
Lastly, given that gender was not equally distributed across both rumination groups, an
identical analysis on meta-d’ – d’ value, with Gender (male, female) as an additional
between-subjects variable was conducted. Results showed that interaction effect among
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Valence, Group, and Mood, [F(1, 52) = 8.20, p = .006, partial η2 = .14], remained statistically
significant after controlling Gender, [F(1, 52) = .03, p > .05, partial η2 = .00]. Summary of
findings in Experiment 2 can be found in Appendix B.
5.4 Summary
The present experiment aimed to replicate and extend Experiment 1’s findings.
Specifically, the interaction effect between participants’ mood state and trait rumination on
both d’ level and meta-d’ level in affective memory was examined using the sad mood
induction paradigm (Lo et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2020).
As in Experiment 1, Type-1 result showed a non-significant interaction effect among
mood induction, trait rumination, and image valence on memory sensitivity, thus not
supporting the first hypothesis that high ruminators’ lower memory sensitivity for positive
images is driven by sad-mood induction, nor the second hypothesis that high ruminators’
memory sensitivity would be lower for positive images after sad-mood induction. This is
again inconsistent with the prediction that low ruminators will have difficulty forgetting
positive images (i.e., greater d’ level) when compared with high ruminators. Similar to
Experiment 1, we interpret this finding as further evidence that lacking positive memory bias
and deficient positive memory sensitivity are two unrelated cognitive processes.
The current type-2 results support the predicted 3-way interaction effect among mood
induction, trait rumination, and image valence (Mood x Group x Valence), that high
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ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’ – d’) is lower than that of low ruminators for
positive images during sad mood. Since high ruminators’ decreased metacognitive sensitivity
for positive images was not driven by sad-mood induction alone (as the interaction effect
between Mood and Valence was insignificant), the current finding illustrated the interaction
effect between sad mood state and trait rumination on metacognitive sensitivity, as in line
with the interaction effect literature (Cooney et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2020). This suggests
that sad mood state and trait rumination interact to reduce individual metacognition of
positive memory, thus according with previous findings showing interaction effects between
sad mood state and trait rumination, whereby trait rumination is activated by a sad mood
state (Zhou et al., 2020) and moderated the effects of negative events on decreased positive
affect, in that decreased positive affect was experienced to a lower degree after a negative
event in high ruminators (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). As explained by impaired
disengagement theory (Koster et al., 2011), trait ruminators’ reduced attentional control
increases ruminative tendency when undergoing sad mood state (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013),
due to individuals’ failure to mentally take control of and withdraw from positive stimuli
(Mor & Daches, 2015).
In addition to the findings that relate to the research hypotheses, Experiment 2
replicated the results of Experiment 1 with respect to type-1 sensitivity analyses (i.e., more
hit rates for remember-images) and response time (faster to remember-images) on type-1
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level regardless of rumination level, as consistent with the directed-forgetting literature
(Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). In addition to these type-1 main
effects, an interaction effect observed among study cue, rumination group, and mood
condition showed that decrease of memory sensitivity from remember- to forget-images was
significant for neutral-mood high ruminators and sad-mood low ruminators, respectively. As
in Experiment 1, neutral-mood induction serves as an unconstrained condition which impairs
self-focused ruminators’ memory by allowing for mind wandering (thus contributing to
lower memory sensitivity – better forgetting). On the other hand, since negative mood states
(sad mood in this experiment) have been found to enhance non-ruminators’ (low ruminators’
in the present case) positive memory retrieval for self-regulation of mood and emotion
(Rusting & DeHart, 2000), low ruminators’ already enhanced memory performance (as
attributed by enhanced positive retrieval) as a function of sad-mood induction would be
furthered by directed-forgetting effect.
In regard to type-2 level analyses, findings showing participants’ higher confidence for
negative as well as for to-be-remembered images replicated those of Experiment 1’s and
previous research’s (Ward et al., 2003). Thus, directed-forgetting effect was seen in both
participants’ type-1 and type-2 performances. Also, the observed effect for rumination group
showed that low ruminators generally had a greater meta-d’ level than high ruminators did.
Finally, the finding that low ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity of positive images
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significantly increased during sad moo suggests that, sad mood has an enhancing effect on
non-ruminators’ metacognitive processing of positive information. Similar to the observed
enhanced d’ level for remember information due to self-regulation effect of mood for sadmood low ruminators, their enhanced meta-d’ level of positive information proposes that
mood-incongruent recalling serves as a cognitive regulator for individuals’ mood and
emotion (Rusting & DeHart, 2000). However, in Experiment 2’s neutral-mood condition,
finding of significant decrease in metacognitive sensitivity of positive images observed in
Experiment 1 was not present, which should be theoretically similar to a neutral-mood
setting since no mood induction was used. One reason might be that compared with the
sample size (n = 60; 30 low ruminators and 30 high ruminators) available in Experiment 1 in
which everyone was allocated to the same-mood condition, only 31 participants were
allocated to the neutral-mood condition in Experiment 2.
In sum, Experiment 2’s results show that during sad mood, high ruminators’
metacognitive sensitivity (but not memory sensitivity) is lower for positive images than low
ruminators in memory task, suggesting that sad mood state interacts with trait rumination to
reduce metacognition of positive memory. Although main effects and interactions were
found among rumination, emotion valence, memory cue, and mood state during assessment
for participants’ type-1 and type-2 memory performances, it remained unclear whether these
results could be replicated and extended to other experimental task paradigms. For instance,
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the rumination/distraction task paradigm (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995) has
been commonly used to examine how engagement in different cognitive tasks influences
participants’ emotions (Wu et al., 2020), depression severity (Roelofs et al., 2009), inner
experience (Moffatt et al., 2020), positive psychotic symptom severity such as auditory
hallucinatory experiences (Anderson et al., 2020), and brain activity (Blackhart & Kline,
2005; Kline et al., 1998; Kline et al., 2002; Kline et al., 1999; Kline et al., 2001; Tomarken &
Davidson, 1994). Since many studies have shown that performing a ruminative response task
as induced rumination (with distractive response task as control) is associated with increased
negative affect (e.g., Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993,
1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Trask &
Sigmon, 1999), its effect would be similar to that of sad-mood induction in terms of
experimental mood state manipulation. Following this line of research, therefore, Experiment
3 aimed to examine whether Experiment 2’s effects of sad mood state on low and high
ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity can be found under the rumination/distraction task
paradigm.

CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT THREE

6.1 Overview and Research Hypothesis
Results of Experiment 2 indicated that ruminators are metacognitive less sensitive to
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their positive memory during sad mood; ruminators have been furthered impaired of their
metacognition of positive information. Given that sad mood state induced by ruminating
response task interacts with trait rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), we
need to evaluate such interaction between sad mood state and trait rumination for examining
the effects of negative memory bias on cognitive processes (Grant et al., 2019). Experiment
3’s objectives were to replicate and extend Experiment 2’s findings, and investigate whether
ruminating response and trait rumination interact (state x trait) to influence meta-d’ for low
and high ruminators differently, using the rumination/distraction task paradigm (Blagden &
Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Trask & Sigmon, 1999) for replicating Experiment
Two’s findings beyond the mood-induction paradigm for greater generalizability of result.
Therefore, this was a Task (rumination-focused vs. distraction-focused) x Trait (low vs. high)
x Valence (negative vs. positive) x Cue (forget vs. remember) designed experiment. Similar
to Experiment 2, given that rumination is associated with decreased positive memory
retrieval (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), which is also found to be triggered by a sad mood state
(Grant et al., 2019) that can be induced by engagement in rumination-focused task (Blagden
& Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow & NolenHoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Trask & Sigmon, 1999), the expected
interaction effects were hypothesized to test both the effect of ruminative state (as induced
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by rumination-focused task) and interaction between ruminative state and trait rumination
separately, as follows:
H1: Engagement in a rumination-focused task would result in lower memory sensitivity
for positive images than engagement in a distraction-focused task.
H2: Participants with higher trait rumination would demonstrate lower memory sensitivity
for positive images in response to the rumination-focused task than the distraction
condition.
Also, assuming that lack of positive information bias is driven by reduced metacognitive
sensitivity, high ruminators’ lower metacognitive sensitivity for positive images would be
further decreased by engaging in rumination task. Thus, it was hypothesized that:
H3: Engagement in a rumination-focused task would result in lower metacognitive
sensitivity for positive images than engagement in a distraction-focused task.
H4: Participants with higher trait rumination would demonstrate lower metacognitive
sensitivity for positive images in response to the rumination-focused task than the
distraction condition.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
Experiment 3 adopted the same selection criteria and sampling as in previous
experiments. Convenient sampling targeting both researcher student’s network and Lingnan
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University population was employed. After exclusion of 4 participants for failure to return
results files and 2 participants for memory task incompletion, the final sample consisted of
68 (35 males, 51.5%) participants who agreed to take part for monetary rewards on a
$50/hour basis.
6.2.2 Materials
Identical DASS-21, RRS, and experimental stimuli were used as in previous
experiments.
6.2.3 Response manipulation tasks
Participants engaged in either a ruminative response task or distraction response task
following previous protocol (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1993, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Trask
& Sigmon, 1999) prior to the identical memory task. These response manipulation tasks
were employed for influencing participants’ thought contents, by asking them to mentally
focus themselves and make imagination using some written items (see Appendices H and I
for exact instructions). The rumination and distraction tasks consisted of 45 items,
respectively. Each written item was presented alone for approximately 15 seconds on a
computer screen. The rumination task was designed to focus participants’ attention on
thoughts that were emotion focused, symptom focused, and self-focused (e.g., “think about
your character and who you strive to be” and “think about how hopeful / hopeless you are
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feeling.”), while the distraction task focused participants’ attention on thoughts that were
externally focused and irrelevant to symptoms, emotions, or the self (e.g.,, “think about
clouds forming in the sky” and “think about the shiny surface of a smartphone”). These
rumination task and distraction task items have been considered equally neutral.
6.2.4 Procedure
Experimental procedure was identical to that in Experiment 2. However, prior to the
computer memory task, participants were assigned to either a rumination-focused condition
or a distraction-focused condition in counterbalanced order following past literature
(Blackhart & Kline, 2005; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). As in Experiment 2,
participants were asked to complete VAS to assess mood both before and after the task. After
engaging in the cognitive task, participants subsequently underwent the study phase and then
test phase of the directed-forgetting memory task. Debriefing was given at the end of the
experiment.
6.2.5 Data processing
Similarly, Experiment 3 was based on a trait by state design. A within-participants
(Valence: negative vs. positive, Cue: forget vs. remember) and between-participants (Group:
low rumination vs. high rumination, Task: rumination-focused vs. distraction-focused) mixed
ANOVA design was adopted. Identical to Experiment 2, memory sensitivity [d’ = z(hit rate) z(false alarm rate)] was assessed for the recognition task. Based on this, metacognitive
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sensitivity (as calculated by meta-d’) was then assessed for each response type (i.e.,
negative-forget images, negative-remember images, positive-forget images, and positiveremember images) following similar procedure to previous experiments. The aims were to
replicate Experiment 2’s finding and test for potential interaction effects between trait
rumination and sad mood state on participants’ meta-d’ level.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Reliability and correlation analyses
Reliability analysis showed high internal consistencies for both DASS-Depression
subscale (Cronbach’s α = .85) and RRS (Cronbach’s α = .89) with current sample. Pearson
correlation indicated a strong correlation between DASS and RRS (r = .27, p < .05), as
similarly obtained in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 following the literature (Joormann et
al., 2011; Whisman et al., 2020).
6.3.2 Group characteristics
There were 34 participants in low and high rumination groups respectively, after
median-split (RRS median = 48.5) (De Lissnyder & Koster, 2012; Koster et al., 2013).
Current sample size (n = 68) was considered acceptable in comparison with previous
directed-forgetting metacognitive studies (e.g., Friedman & Castel, 2011; Lee & Hsu, 2013).
Both groups did not significantly differ in age, t(66) =.06, two-tailed p > .05, nor in
depression score, t(66) = .42, two-tailed p = .674, while differed significantly in RRS score,
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t(66) = 11.41, two-tailed p < .001, as expected (see Table 4).

Table 4
Baseline comparison between low and high ruminators: Experiment 3
N

Age (years)

RRS

DASS

Group

Male

Female

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Low

19

15

35.3

6.8

40.9

5.6

12.9

3.2

High

16

18

35.4

5.6

57.1

6.1

13.2

3.1

Note. RRS = Ruminative Response Scale. DASS = only the depression domain of the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale was employed. Low and high rumination scores represent the
lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split = 48.5.

6.3.3 Response manipulation effect
Thirty-four participants (17 males and 17 females) were randomly assigned to
distraction-task condition and 34 participants (18 males and 16 females) assigned to
rumination-task condition. A subsequent Chi-square test of independence was conducted.
Results showed that there was no significant association between gender and response task,
X2 (1, N = 68) = 0.1, p = .808. No difference in relation to age, [F(1, 66) = 1.00, p > .05], or
RRS scores, [F(1, 66) = 1.15, p > .05], was observed across the two task conditions. Similar
to Experiment 2, for comparing the change of mood dimensions of VAS before and after
response manipulation task procedures, two Paired-Samples T-Tests on sad-mood and
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neutral-mood participants regarding VAS-happiness, VAS-sadness, and VAS-arousal
dimensions were performed, respectively. For rumination-task condition, there was a
significant decrease from time point 1 (before response manipulation task; M = 53.8, SD =
16.8) to time point 2 (after response manipulation task; M = 37.5, SD = 18.3) in VAShappiness, t(33) = 6.13, two-tailed p < .001; a significant increase in from time point 1
(before response manipulation task; M = 26.9, SD = 21.7) to time point 2 (after response
manipulation task; M = 50.9, SD = 23.7) in VAS-sadness, t(33) = 6.08, two-tailed p < .001,
while no significant mean difference was observed between time point 1 (before response
manipulation task; M = 39.9, SD = 18.3) and time point 2 (after response manipulation task;
M = 37.6, SD = 21.9) in VAS-arousal, t(33) = 1.09, two-tailed p > .05 (Figure 10). For
distraction-task condition, there were no significant mean differences between the two time
points in VAS-happiness, t(33) =.29, two-tailed p > .05, VAS-sadness, t(33) = 1.65, twotailed p > .05, and VAS-arousal, t(33) =1.08, two-tailed p > .05 (Figure 10). In addition, a 2 x
2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Time Point (before, after response manipulation task) x VAS
dimension (happiness, sadness, arousal) as within-participants variables and Task
(rumination-focused, distraction-focused) as between-participants variable was also
conducted. Results indicated a significant interaction among Time Point, VAS dimension,
and Task, [F(1, 66) = 9.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .12], was observed after Bonferroni
corrections. To conclude, rumination-task participants indicated lower happiness level and
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higher sadness level compared with distraction-task participants, while arousal scores did not
differ significantly for everyone after response manipulation task.

Figure 10. Means (+SD) of VAS score as function of measure time point and VAS
dimensions in each response task condition: Experiment 3. T1 = mood measured before
response task. T2 = mood measured after response task. Low and high rumination scores
represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

6.3.4 Type-1 sensitivity analyses
6.3.4.1 Memory sensitivity (d’)
As with previous experiments, participants’ memory sensitivity, d’, was analyzed in all
recognition task conditions. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive)
and Cue (forget, remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low
rumination, high rumination) and Task (rumination, distraction) as between-participants
variables was conducted. This analysis yielded main effect for Cue, [F(1, 64) = 25.89, p
< .001, partial η2 = .29], showing that d’ was higher for remember-images (M = 2.54, SE
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= .09; 95% CI, 2.36 – 2.72) than for forget-images (M = 2.14, SE = .07; 95% CI, 2.00 –
2.29), thus replicating previous experiments and past results in observing directed-forgetting
effect (Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). Main effect was also observed
for Valence, [F(1, 64) = 7.87, p = .007, partial η2 = .11], whereby memory sensitivity was
overall higher when attending to negative-valence images (M = 2.44, SE = .08; 95% CI, 2.28
– 2.61) than to positive-valence images (M = 2.24, SE = .08; 95% CI, 2.08 – 2.40). However,
unlike Experiment 1’s and Experiment 2’s findings, all current interaction effects were nonsignificant (thus H1 and H2 were both rejected).
6.3.4.2 Response time
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) and Task (rumination, distraction) as between-participants variables was
performed. This analysis yielded main effect for Valence, [F(1, 64) = 5.53, p = .022, partial
η2 = .08], and main effect for Cue, [F(1, 64) = 34.41, p < .001, partial η2 = .35], after
Bonferroni corrections. Results indicated that overall participants responded faster to
negative-valence images (M = 2607.61ms, SE = 54.14ms; 95% CI, 2499.45 – 2715.77) than
to positive-valence images (M = 2704.98ms, SE = 69.04ms; 95% CI, 2567.06 – 2842.90);
and faster to remember-images (M = 2540.50ms, SE = 55.82ms; 95% CI, 2428.98 – 2652.02)
than to forget-images (M = 2772.09ms, SE = 67.11ms; 95% CI, 2638.03 – 2906.15). Also,
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interaction effect between Cue and Task, [F(1, 64) = 5.18, p = .026, partial η2 = .08], was
observed after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that while both mean
differences of response time between rumination task and distraction task for remember- and
forget- images were not significant (all ps > .05), both decrease of response time from forgetimages (M = 2776.57ms, SE = 405.83ms) to remember-images (M = 2621.43ms, SE =
436.37ms) for rumination-focused participants, t(33) = 3.05, two-tailed p = .005, as well as
decrease of response time from forget-images (M = 2777.53ms, SE = 659.07ms) to
remember-images (M = 2449.18ms, SE = 473.89ms) for distraction-focused participants,
t(33) = 5.57, two-tailed p < .001, were significant (Figure 11). Other main/interaction effects
were non-significant.
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Figure 11. Means of response time (ms) as function of response task and cue: Experiment 3.

6.3.5 Type-2 sensitivity analyses
Similar to Experiment 2, mean differences among the various experimental conditions
at the level of metacognition were examined:
6.3.5.1 Confidence rating
First, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
remember) as within-participants variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high
rumination) and Task (rumination,distraction) as between-participants variables was
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conducted on confidence rating. This analysis yielded main effect for Valence, [F(1, 64) =
23.39, p < .001, partial η2 = .27], after Bonferroni corrections, showing that confidence
rating was higher for negative-valence images (M = 3.17, SE = .05; 95% CI, 3.08 – 3.26)
than for positive-valence images (M = 3.06, SE = .06; 95% CI, 2.95 – 3.17). Also, main
effect for Cue, [F(1, 64) = 45.13, p < .001, partial η2 = .41], was observed, whereby
confidence rating was higher for remember-mages (M = 3.24, SE = .05; 95% CI, 3.14 – 3.34)
than for forget-images (M = 3.00, SE = .06; 95% CI, 2.89 – 3.11). As regards betweensubjects factors, both between-participants effects for Group, [F(1, 64) = 11.12, p = .001,
partial η2 = .15], as well as Task, [F(1, 64) = 5.69, p = .020, partial η2 = .08], were
significant. Results were contrary to those observed in Experiment 1, indicating that high
ruminators (M = 3.28, SE = .07; 95% CI, 3.14 – 3.42) were more confident than low
ruminators (M = 2.95, SE = .07; 95% CI, 2.81 – 3.09), and rumination-task participants (M =
3.28, SE = .07; 95% CI, 3.14 – 3.42) were more confident than distraction-task participants
(M = 3.28, SE = .07; 95% CI, 3.14 – 3.42) when averaged.
Moreover, interaction effect among Valence, Group, and Task, [F(1, 64) = 10.20, p
= .002, partial η2 = .14], was observed after Bonferroni corrections. Follow-up t-tests
indicated that only decrease of mean of confidence rating from negative-images (M = 3.00,
SE = .14) to positive-images (M = 2.85, SE = .14), was significant for low ruminators, t(13)
= 2.73, two-tailed p = .017, in distraction-task condition (Figure 12). On the other hand, in
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rumination-task condition, high ruminators’ means of confidence rating for negative-images
(M = 3.60, SE = .26), t(32) = 5.65, two-tailed p < .001, and positive-images (M = 3.38, SE
= .39), t(32) = 2.65, two-tailed p = .010, were significantly higher relative to low ruminators
(Mnegative = 3.00, SE = .37; Mpositive = 2.96, SE = .49). Also, high ruminators’ mean of
confidence rating decreased significantly, t(13) = 5.11, two-tailed p < .001, from negativeimages (M = 3.60, SE = .07) to positive-images (M = 3.38, SE = .10) (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Means of participants’ confidence rating as function of rumination scores and
image valence in each response task condition: Experiment 3. Low and high rumination
scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

6.3.5.2 Metacognitive sensitivity (Meta-d’)
Similar to previous experiments, participants’ meta-d’ level as the main dependent
variable in Experiment 3 was examined prior to subsequent analyses. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed
ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (TBF, TBR) as within-participants
variables, as well as Group (low rumination, high rumination) and Task (rumination,
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distraction) as between-participants variables was conducted. This analysis indicated main
effect for Cue, [F(1, 64) = 35.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .36]. Follow-up comparisons
indicated that each pairwise difference was also significant, p < .001. Meta-d’ was
significantly higher for TBR (M = 2.52, SE = .09; 95% CI, 2.33 – 2.70) than for TBF (M =
1.89, SE = .08; 95% CI, 1.74 – 2.05) images when averaged, suggesting that overall
participants’ metacognitive sensitivity was higher for TBR images. Furthermore, a
significant interaction among Valence, Group, and Task, [F(1, 64) = 5.76, p = .019, partial η2
= .08], was observed after Bonferroni corrections (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Means of meta-d’ as function of rumination scores and cue in each response task:
Experiment 3. Low and high rumination scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on
RRS based on median-split.

6.3.5.3 Value of difference between meta-d’ and d’ (meta-d’ – d’)
As in previous experiments, analysis of meta-d’ – d’ value was preferred over meta-d’
level. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) and Cue (forget,
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remember) as within-participants factors, Group (low rumination, high rumination) and Task
(rumination, distraction) as between-participants factors was conducted. This analysis
indicated main between-participants effect for Group, [F(1, 64) = 5.11, p = .027, partial η2
= .07], whereby low ruminators generally had a greater meta-d’ – d’ value (M = .03, SE
= .10; 95% CI, -.18 – .24) relative to high ruminators (M = -.30, SE = .10; 95% CI, -.51 –
-.09), as assumed. Since no significant interaction effect was observed between Task and
Valence, [F(1, 64) = .54, p = .463, partial η2 = .01], the hypothesis that decrease of meta-d’
level for positive images is only driven by engagement in rumination-focused task could not
be supported (H3 was rejected). More importantly, interaction effect among Valence, Group,
and Task, [F(1, 64) = 4.49, p = .038, partial η2 = .07], was observed after Bonferroni
corrections. Follow-up t-tests indicated that while no main effects/interactions existed in
distraction-task condition (all ps > .05) (Figure 14), mean of meta-d’ – d’ value of positivevalence images for high ruminators (M = -.65, SE = .29) was significantly lower, t(32) =
3.00, two-tailed p = .009, relative to low ruminators (M = .36, SE = .19) in rumination-task
condition, as hypothesized (H4 was supported). Also, low ruminators’ mean of meta-d’ – d’
value of positive-valence images increased significantly (Mnegative = -.17, SE = .17; Mpositive
= .36, SE = .19), t(19) = 2.18, two-tailed p = .042 (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Means (+SEM) of difference between meta-d’ and d’ as function of rumination
scores and image valence in each response task: Experiment 3. Low and high rumination
scores represent the lower and higher percentiles on RRS based on median-split.

6.3.5.4 Additional analyses
Lastly, given that gender was unequally distributed across both rumination groups, an
identical analysis on meta-d’ – d’ value, with Gender (male, female) as an additional
between-subjects variable was conducted. Results indicated that interaction effect among
Valence, Group, and Task, [F(1, 60) = 4.50, p = .038, partial η2 = .07], remained statistically
significant after controlling Gender, [F(1, 60) = .45, p > .05, partial η2 = .01]. Summary of
findings in Experiment 3 can be found in Appendix C.
6.4 Summary
The present experiment aimed to replicate and extend Experiment 1’s and Experiment
2’s findings. Particularly, the interaction effect between participants’ mood state and trait
rumination on both memory sensitivity and metacognitive sensitivity was further examined
using the rumination/distraction experimental paradigm (Blagden & Craske, 1996;
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Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Trask & Sigmon, 1999).
Similar to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the current Type-1 result did not show a
significant interaction effect among cognitive task, trait rumination, and image valence on
memory sensitivity (in fact, no main/interaction effects of any kind were found), thus the
first hypothesis that high ruminators’ lower memory sensitivity for positive images is driven
by cognitive task was not supported, nor the second hypothesis that high ruminators’
memory sensitivity would be lower for positive images after engaging in rumination-focused
task. As with the previous two experiments, the current finding contradicted the predicted
effect that low ruminators will have difficulty forgetting positive images (i.e., higher memory
sensitivity) relative to high ruminators. On a similar vein, this finding is possibly conceived
as evidence from the rumination/distraction experimental paradigm that a lack of positive
memory bias (rumination) and lower memory sensitivity for positive information are two
unrelated cognitive processes.
Similar to Experiment 2, the current type-2 metacognitive processing results support
the 3-way interaction hypothesis predicting the relationship among cognitive task, trait
rumination, and image valence (Task x Group x Valence) that high ruminators’ metacognitive
sensitivity (measured in terms of meta-d’ – d’) is lower than that of low ruminators for
positive images after engaging in rumination-focused task. Given that high ruminators’ lower
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metacognitive sensitivity for positive images was not driven by engagement in ruminationfocused task alone (as the interaction effect between Task and Valence was insignificant),
this finding illustrated the interaction effect between rumination task and trait rumination on
metacognitive sensitivity, as corresponding to the interaction effect literature under the
rumination/distraction experimental paradigm (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1993; Trask & Sigmon, 1999). It is suggested again that a ruminative state (as
induced by engaging in rumination-focused task) and trait rumination interact to reduce
individual metacognitive sensitivity of positive memory, thus following previous research
indicating interaction effects between ruminative state and trait rumination, in that decreased
positive affect was experienced to a lower degree after a negative event in high ruminators
(Moberly & Watins, 2008).
Besides current results that relate to the research hypotheses, other findings that
examined the interaction effect between participants’ cognitive task and trait rumination on
metacognitive sensitivity replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2, with respect to type-1
sensitivity analyses (i.e., more hit rates for remember-images) and response time (faster to
remember-images) on type-1 level regardless of rumination level, as consistent with the
literature (Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). Furthermore, the observed
interaction between study cue and response task indicated that both decrease of response
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time from forget-images to remember-images for rumination-focused participants, as well as
decrease of response time from forget-images to remember-images for distraction-focused
participants were significant.
As for other type-2 level analyses, results indicated that participants’ higher confidence
for negative as well as for to-be-remembered images replicated those of previous
experiments and past research (Ward et al., 2003). Between-participants effects for
rumination group and response task indicated that high ruminators, as were rumination-task
participants, were more confident than low ruminators and distraction-task participants on
average. Also, the observed interaction among emotion valence, rumination group, and
response task indicated that after distraction-focused task, low ruminators’ confidence
decreased significantly when attending to positive images. After rumination-focused task, on
the other hand, both confidence ratings for negative- as well as for positive-images were
significantly higher relative to low ruminators. Recommended (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012)
analysis of meta-d’ level (as measured in terms of meta-d’ – d’ value) indicated a betweenparticipants effect for rumination group, showing that low ruminators had higher
metacognitive sensitivity than high ruminators when averaged. Finally, as in Experiment 2,
low ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity (measured at meta-d’ – d’ value) for attending
positive-valence images was significantly enhanced after rumination-focused task,
suggesting that ruminative tasking enhances metacognitive processing of positive
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information for non-ruminators. Thus, Experiment 3’s observation was again in line with
previous research showing that rumination task enhances non-ruminators’ retrieval of
positive memory as a function of mood-incongruent recall serving to regulate affectivity
(Erber & Erber, 1994; Rusting & DeHart, 2000). The current results suggest that assigning
rumination-response task to non-ruminators (Experiment 3) is as effective as experiencing
sad mood (Experiment 2), in terms of increasing accessibility of positive memory so that
people recall pleasant events in the past to buffer themselves against unpleasant moods, thus
showing mood-incongruent effect (e.g., Josephson et al., 1996). Again, as in Experiment 2’s
neutral-mood condition, findings of significant decrease in metacognitive sensitivity of
positive-images, as well as significantly higher metacognitive sensitivity of negative-images
for high ruminators found in Experiment 1 were not observed in Experiment 3. It is similarly
speculated that this non-effect was due to small sample size (only 34 participants assigned to
distraction-task condition versus 60 participants all allocated in the same theoreticallyneutral-distraction-task-condition). In summary, Experiment 3’s findings show that after
engaging in rumination-focused task, high ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity (but not
memory sensitivity) is lower for positive images relative to low ruminators in memory task.
It is suggested that a ruminative state as induced by engagement in rumination-focused task
interacts with trait rumination to impair metacognition of positive memory.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Thesis Summary and Discussion
Taking an innovative SDT meta-d’ approach (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), the current
study explores ruminators’ insight into their own biased memory processing, namely
metacognitive sensitivity of positive memory, using directed-forgetting task (Anderson &
Hanslmayr, 2014; Fawcett & Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2018) with affective pictures (Gruhn
& Scheibe, 2008). The experiments reported here are based on the need to evaluate both trait
rumination, as well as the interaction between sad mood state and trait rumination for
examining the effects of rumination, known as lack of positive memory bias (Clark &
Watson, 1991; Emery et al., 2020; Liang et al., 2011), on cognitive processes (Grant et al.,
2019) by investigating the effects of study cue, memory valence, trait rumination, and sad
mood state (induced by sad mood induction and rumination-focused task, respectively) on
metacognitive sensitivity. In Experiment 1, findings from type-2 (secondary-level
processing) metacognitive sensitivity analyses supports the hypothesized interaction effect
between trait rumination and image valence (Trait x Valence), indicating that ruminators’
metacognitive sensitivity (as measured in terms of the value of difference between meta-d’
and d’, viz., meta-d’ – d’) is lower for positive images relative to low ruminators. This
association between rumination and reduced metacognitive processing of positive-images
suggests that, when ruminators attempt to retrieve positive memories, the ability to track
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them accurately via confidence reduces significantly. Ruminators appear to be less aware of
the positive aspects of past experiences. In other words, ruminators do not know whether
they know or do not know – they have inaccurate/poor metacognition – in the domain of
positive memory. Since the literature has documented that ruminators lack positive memory
bias that non-ruminators have (Clark & Watson, 1991; Diener & Emmons, 1985; Grant et al.,
2019; Liang et al., 2011), the present finding suggests that there is a relationship between a
lack of positive memory bias and deficient metacognition of positive memory.
This significant finding is replicated and extended by Experiment 2, in which the
predicted 3-way interaction effect among mood induction, trait rumination, and image
valence (Mood x Group x Valence), that high ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’
– d’) is lower than that of low ruminators for positive images during sad mood. Since high
ruminators’ decreased metacognitive sensitivity for positive images could not have been
driven solely by sad mood induction (as the interaction effect between Mood and Valence
was insignificant), the finding illustrates the interaction effect between sad mood state and
trait rumination on metacognitive sensitivity, as in line with the interaction effect literature
(Cooney et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2020).
Similar finding is also observed in Experiment 3 in which the 3-way interaction
hypothesis predicting the relationship among cognitive task, trait rumination, and image
valence (Task x Group x Valence) is supported, whereby high ruminators’ metacognitive
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sensitivity (measured in terms of meta-d’ – d’) is lower than that of low ruminators for
positive images after engaging in rumination-focused task. Given that high ruminators’ lower
metacognitive sensitivity for positive images was not driven by engagement in ruminationfocused task alone (as the interaction effect between Task and Valence was insignificant),
this finding illustrates the interaction effect between rumination task and trait rumination on
metacognitive sensitivity, as corresponding to the interaction effect literature under the
rumination/distraction experimental paradigm (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1993; Trask & Sigmon, 1999). Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a
dissociation between firstly interaction effect between sad mood state (as induced by sad
mood induction in Experiment 2 and rumination-focused task in Experiment 3, respectively)
and trait rumination and secondly main effects of sad mood state. Most importantly, sad
mood state / ruminative state and trait rumination interact to impair individual metacognitive
sensitivity of positive memory. This finding is in line with previous research indicating
interaction effects between sad mood state and trait rumination, whereby trait rumination is
triggered by a sad mood state (Zhou et al., 2020) and moderated the effects of negative
events on lower positive affect, in that decreased positive affect was experienced to a lower
degree after a negative event in high ruminators (Moberly & Watins, 2008). According to the
impaired disengagement theory (Koster et al., 2011), ruminators’ reduced attentional control
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increases rumination when undergoing a sad mood state (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), as a
result of individuals’ failure to mentally take control of and withdraw from positive stimuli
(Mor & Daches, 2015).
However, the other two main hypotheses of the present study that high ruminators’
memory sensitivity (measured in terms of d’ level) would be lower for positive images
(Experiment 1), and high ruminators’ memory sensitivity would be lower for positive images
after sad mood induction (Experiment 2) or engagement in rumination-focused task
(Experiment 3) as a result of either its interaction with trait rumination or its main effect are
not supported by the experiments, in which type-1 memory sensitivity analyses do not
provide significant interaction effects between rumination group and image valence
(Experiment 1), as well as among rumination group, image valence, and sad mood state
(Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). These are inconsistent with the prediction that low
ruminators will have difficulty forgetting positive images, namely having higher “hit” rate
than “false alarm” rate (i.e., greater d’ level) for positive images, whereas high ruminators
will not. A potential interpretation would be that rumination is not related to lower memory
sensitivity for positive information. Specifically, (lacking) positive memory bias or low
positive affect characteristic of ruminators (Clark & Watson, 1991; Emery et al., 2020) and
(lower) positive memory sensitivity are two distinct mechanisms that might involve different
cognitive processes. Thus, it is suggested that there is no relationship between a lack of
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positive memory bias and lower positive memory sensitivity.
In addition to the findings of the main hypotheses, Experiment 1 shows that
participants’ higher memory sensitivity and faster response time were associated with
remember-images regardless of rumination level, thus according the type-1 sensitivity
finding with existing directed-forgetting knowledge (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Fawcett
& Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2018). However, the effect of study cue was relatively
insignificant in type-2 sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, type-2 results indicate that high
ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity for negative images was significantly higher when
compared with low ruminators. According to theoretical models of depression (Teasdale &
Barnard, 1993), ruminators hold beliefs that rumination helps increase self-awareness,
understand depressed mood, solve problems, and prevent them from making future mistakes
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Thus, the current finding is in line with the literature showing
that possessing a ruminative response style as a self-focus cognitive processing (Watkins &
Baracaia, 2001) actually assists in increasing the negative aspects of self-awareness, whereby
the ability to reflect on and monitor one’s negative memory is strengthened. However, such
“enhanced” accessibility to one’s negative past does not necessary come at the cost of
reducing that to the positive, as the literature has long suggested that negative affect and
positive affect are two independent psychological constructs (Diener & Emmons, 1985).
Since rumination involves both increases in negative affect and decreases in / lack of positive
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affect (e.g., Clark & Watson, 1991), this finding is consistent with past research. It also
accorded with neurobiological evidence indicating that, ruminators with impaired prefrontal
control and a hyperactive amygdala are subject to negative biases in attention and memory
(Disner et al., 2011).
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 with respect to type-1 sensitivity
analyses (i.e., more hit rates for remember-images) and response time (faster to rememberimages) on type-1 level regardless of rumination level, as consistent with the directedforgetting literature (Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011; MacLeod, 1998). In addition to
these type-1 main effects, an interaction effect observed among study cue, rumination group,
and mood condition showed that decrease of memory sensitivity from remember- to forgetimages was significant for neutral-mood high ruminators and sad-mood low ruminators,
respectively. As in Experiment 1, neutral-mood induction serves as an unconstrained
condition which impairs self-focused ruminators’ memory by allowing for mind wandering
(thus contributing to lower memory sensitivity – better forgetting). On the other hand, since
negative mood states (sad mood in this experiment) have been found to enhance nonruminators’ (low ruminators’ in the present case) positive memory retrieval for selfregulation of mood and emotion (Rusting & DeHart, 2000), low ruminators’ already
enhanced memory performance (as attributed by enhanced positive retrieval) as a function of
sad-mood induction would be furthered by directed-forgetting effect.

117

Also, in regard to type-2 level analyses, findings showing participants’ higher
confidence for negative as well as for to-be-remembered images replicate those of
Experiment 1’s and previous research’s (Ward et al., 2003). Thus, directed-forgetting effect
was seen in both participants’ type-1 and type-2 performances. Also, the observed effect for
rumination group shows that low ruminators generally had a greater meta-d’ level than high
ruminators did. Lastly, the finding that low ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity of positive
images significantly increased during sad mood suggests that, sad mood has an enhancing
effect on non-ruminators’ metacognitive processing of positive information. Similar to the
observed enhanced d’ level for remember information due to self-regulation effect of mood
for sad-mood low ruminators, their enhanced meta-d’ level of positive information proposes
that mood-incongruent recalling serves as a cognitive regulator for individuals’ mood and
emotion (Rusting & DeHart, 2000).
In regard to examining the interaction effect between participants’ cognitive task and
trait rumination on metacognitive sensitivity, Experiment 3’s findings replicate those of
Experiments 1 and 2, with respect to type-1 sensitivity analyses (i.e., more hit rates for
remember-images) and response time (faster to remember-images) on type-1 level regardless
of rumination level, as consistent with the literature (Block, 2009; Goernert et al., 2011;
MacLeod, 1998). Furthermore, the observed interaction between study cue and response task
indicated that both decrease of response time from forget-images to remember-images for
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rumination-focused participants, as well as decrease of response time from forget-images to
remember-images for distraction-focused participants were significant. Other type-2 level
results indicate that participants’ higher confidence for negative as well as for to-beremembered images replicated those of previous experiments and past research (Ward et al.,
2003). Between-participants effects for rumination group and response task indicated that
high ruminators, as were rumination-task participants, were more confident than low
ruminators and distraction-task participants on average. Also, the observed interaction
among emotion valence, rumination group, and response task indicated that after distractionfocused task, low ruminators’ confidence decreased significantly when attending to positive
images. After rumination-focused task, on the other hand, both confidence ratings for
negative- as well as for positive-images were significantly higher relative to low ruminators.
Recommended (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) analysis of meta-d’ level (as measured in terms of
meta-d’ – d’ value) indicated a between-participants effect for rumination group, showing
that low ruminators had higher metacognitive sensitivity than high ruminators when
averaged.
Finally, Experiments 2 and 3 show that low ruminators’ metacognitive sensitivity
(measured at meta-d’ – d’ value) for attending positive-valence images was significantly
enhanced after sad mood induction (Experiment 2) and rumination-focused task (Experiment
3), respectively. These findings suggest that sad mood state (as induced by mood induction
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and by ruminative tasking) enhances metacognitive processing of positive information for
non-ruminators, thus are in line with previous research showing that sad mood induction or
rumination task enhances non-ruminators’ retrieval of positive memory as a function of
mood-incongruent recall serving to regulate affectivity (Erber & Erber, 1994; Rusting &
DeHart, 2000). The current results suggest that inducing sad mood (Experiment 2) is as
effective as assigning rumination-response task to non-ruminators (Experiment 3), in terms
of increasing accessibility of positive memory so that people recall pleasant events in the
past to buffer themselves against unpleasant moods, thus showing mood-incongruent effect
(e.g., Josephson et al., 1996).
It is worth noting that although median rumination group cut-off scores in Experiments
2 (49) and Experiment 3 (48.5) are higher than that in Experiment 1 (40.5), this should not
affect the findings of both type-1 and type-2 performance as long as depression screening
procedure has been implemented prior to each experiment.
The present study has empirically demonstrated, for the first time, that trait rumination
and sad mood state are associated with metacognitive processing deficits in positive memory.
Specifically, it is the interaction between state and trait ruminations that impacts
metacognition of positive memory. Lacking positive memory bias refers to preferential
recalling of negative information for autobiographical details and lexical material (Gotlib &
Joormann, 2010). It is considered not only a symptom, but also a risk factor for depression
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onset and relapse (Beck, 2005; De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Thus, the present findings
contribute to the rumination literature by interpreting ruminators’ more accessible retrieval to
negative memory as having better ability to track and monitor their negative memory
performance through confidence (more accurate metacognition of negative memory) –
namely, they know better whether they know or not regarding the negative past. On the
contrary, ruminators’ less memorable positive material (be it past personal events or
previously studied words or images) is attributed to their worse ability to track positive
memory performance through confidence, hence unsure if they know or do not know about
positive information in the past (inaccurate metacognition).
For non-ruminators who retrieve negative experiences, they feel unsure if the memory
is accurate; when sad things occur (as simulated by mood induction in Experiment 2 and
rumination-focused task in Experiment 3), they become good at tracking pleasant
experiences as to protect inner feeling. For ruminators, accurate negative retrieval becomes a
“strength” thanks to their self-focusing characteristic – a strength also named a lack of
positive memory bias that comes hand in hand with a weakness in accurate positive retrieval.
While the current findings confirm the well-established literature documenting the
relationship between depression and rumination (Bradley et al., 1995; Harmer et al., 2009;
LeMoult and Gotlib, 2019), they suggest that such linkage extends to non-clinical depressed
populations.
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The literature indicates that dysfunctional metacognition is associated with
psychopathologies. Sun et al. (2017)’s meta-analytic review shows that patient group had
elevated metacognitive dysfunctions as measured on MCQ dimensions. The group effects
were large and robust for the two negative beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the uncontrollability and
danger of thoughts, and beliefs about the need to control thoughts), as well as moderate and
unstable for the positive beliefs. Patients showed decreased cognitive confidence and
heightened cognitive self-consciousness on moderate to large levels. The study further
reveals that negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of thoughts were most
prevalent in generalized anxiety disorder, whereas heightened cognitive self-consciousness
was more characteristic in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Generalized anxiety disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder and eating disorders manifested more similar metacognitive
profiles than other disorders. Therefore, deficient metacognition is a common process across
psychopathologies (Sun et al., 2017), and the current research findings accord with existing
linkage between metacognitive deficits and psychopathology.
Despite the fact that research on the relationship between metacognition and such as
well as other psychopathologies has been conducted and results consistent, metacognitive
mechanisms of transdiagnostic cognitive markers that are found to exist among them are
much less known. Adding to this, the present findings thus have provided objective evidence
based on Maniscalco and Lau (2012)’s meta-d’ measures, showing that, firstly, apart from
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the associations among positive beliefs (what good about it), negative beliefs (what bad
about it), and psychopathologies found only using subjective questionnaire about
respondents’ self-thought, the experimental data calculated from psychophysical estimates
reported here suggest that rumination is associated with participants’ less certainty about
whether they remember correctly or not regarding positive events. Secondly, the significant
effects observed from the current experiments extend beyond the clinical populations,
indicating that dysfunctional metacognition is also associated with transdiagnostic cognitive
factors, such as rumination, besides major psychopathologies. Overall, the present study has
filled the literature gap by linking rumination with deficient metacognition of positive
memory using an innovative SDT-meta-d’ approach.
7.2 Implications
The present contributions and implications shall be highlighted. First, this is the first
research to examine rumination and metacognition by combining clinical psychology and
psychophysical perspective. Moreover, while most metacognition studies were conducted
using Western samples (for an overview, see Arnon-Ribenfelds et al., 2017), the present three
experiments reported here have included Eastern samples from Hong Kong, Mainland China,
and South Korea, thus achieving higher generalizability for the present findings.
Furthermore, the present research has initiated the application of meta-d’ method in studying
rumination as biased memory processing with regard to metacognitive processing, thus
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inspiring new research using the SDT approach into other cognitive domains, such as
attentional bias and interpretational bias (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), as well as on other
traits including worry (Clancy et al., 2020), anger (Veenstra et al., 2018), and happiness
(Cunningham & Kirkland, 2014). Also, the current findings provide empirical support to
recently developed metacognitive therapies (MCT) targeting rumination and metacognition
as causal and maintaining factors of depression (Wells et al., 2012). Specifically, selfawareness/understanding-oriented MCTs that target at reducing disorder-specific and
individual symptoms through increasing flexibility in cognitive processing (Philipp et al.,
2019) can be enhanced, by informing depressed patients of their decreased ability to
accurately recall (i.e., poor insight into) positive experiences, while simultaneously
providing positive memory enhancement training (Arditte Hall et al., 2018) to reduce
rumination and subsequently lift depression.
7.3 Limitations and Future Research
Given the interesting findings that rumination (lacking positive memory bias) is not
associated with lower positive memory sensitivity (as measured in directed-forgetting task)
but with lower positive metamemory, while memory sensitivity and metacognitive sensitivity
should be positively related (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), more research is needed to explore
more clearly the potential mechanisms that underlie these psychological constructs. Finally,
given the limited sampling range and image presentation trials used in the current three
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experiments, further studies need larger sample sizes (including clinical population) and/or
more experimental trials for larger effect sizes and higher generalizability of result.
Secondly, future clinical research should measure the extent to which insight and positive
memory enhancement interventions reduce rumination level.
In conclusion, this doctoral thesis has contributed to the development of research
methodology for and intervention against rumination in both clinical and cognitive
psychology.
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APPENDICES
A. 2 x 2 Mixed ANOVA Results: Experiment 1
Dependent variable
Valence
Group
Valence x Group
Cue
Cue x Group
Valence x Cue
Valence x Cue x Group

Rt (ms)

Conf

d’

Meta-d’

Meta-d’ – d’

Low conf region

F(1, 58)

.70, ns

17.19***

1.43, ns

2.89, ns

.90, ns

1.61, ns

Partial η2

.01

.23

.02

.05

.02

.03

F(1, 58)

1.93, ns

8.28**

.42 ns

.00, ns

.79, ns

1.24, ns

Partial η2

.03

.13

.01

.00

.01

.02

F(1, 58)

1.73, ns

6.00*

1.99, ns

2.60, ns

4.72*

3.20, ns

Partial η2

.03

.02

.03

.04

.08

.05

F(1, 58)

27.20***

47.80***

32.19***

.03, ns

4.58*

.09, ns

Partial η2

.32

.45

.36

.00

.08

.00

F(1, 58)

.03, ns

2.40, ns

5.46*

8.75**

2.72, ns

3.11, ns

Partial η2

.00

.04

.09

.13

.05

.05

F(1, 58)

.28, ns

.55, ns

.40, ns

1.43, ns

.61, ns

1.57, ns

Partial η2

.01

.01

.01

.02

.01

.03

F(1, 58)

.07, ns

.13, ns

.14, ns

1.26, ns

.69, ns

2.42, ns

Partial η2

.00

.00

.00

.02

.01

.04

Note. Rt = response time; Conf = confidence rating; d’ = memory sensitivity; Meta-d’ = metacognitive sensitivity; Meta-d’ – d’ = mean difference between
metacognitive sensitivity and memory sensitivity; Low conf region = distance between type-2 criterion axis (S1) and type-2 criterion axis (S2).
*p < .01. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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B. 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed ANOVA Results: Experiment 2
Dependent variable
Rt (ms)

Conf

d’

Meta-d’

Meta-d’ – d’

Low conf
region

Valence

F(1, 56)

4.02*

13.20**

4.61*

.94, ns

.06, ns

4.31*

Partial η2

.07

.19

.08

.02

.00

.07

F(1, 56)

.18, ns

.08, ns

.37, ns

7.35**

4.72*

.29, ns

Partial η2

.00

.00

.01

.12

.08

.01

F(1, 56)

.13, ns

1.64, ns

.31, ns

4.78*

2.46, ns

.01, ns

Partial η2

.00

.03

.01

.08

.05

.00

F(1, 56)

.03, ns

1.57, ns

.49, ns

.16, ns

1.32, ns

1.88, ns

Partial η2

.00

.03

.01

.00

.02

.03

F(1, 56)

.00, ns

.44, ns

.02, ns

.54, ns

.31, ns

.02, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.00

.01

.01

.00

Valence x Group

F(1, 56)

2.08, ns

2.38, ns

1.32, ns

4.92*

5.92*

.20, ns

x Mood

Partial η2

.04

.04

.02

.08

.10

.00

Cue

F(1, 56)

36.23***

39.71***

19.03***

14.91***

.24, ns

6.75*

Partial η2

.39

.42

.25

.21

.00

.11

F(1, 56)

.08, ns

.80, ns

.19, ns

3.90, ns

2.73, ns

2.51, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.00

.07

.05

.04

F(1, 56)

2.52, ns

.05, ns

.00, ns

2.96, ns

1.51, ns

1.17, ns

Partial η2

.04

.00

.00

.05

.03

.02

Group
Valence x Group
Mood
Valence x Mood

Cue x Group
Cue x Mood
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Cue x Group x

F(1, 56)

1.27, ns

.52, ns

5.53*

.10, ns

1.01, ns

.04, ns

Mood

Partial η2

.02

.01

.09

.00

.02

.00

Valence x Cue

F(1, 56)

.08, ns

.33, ns

.05, ns

.12, ns

.04, ns

.02, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.00

.00

.00

.00

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 56)

.03, ns

1.18, ns

.56, ns

.01, ns

.14, ns

.26, ns

Group

Partial η2

.00

.02

.01

.00

.00

.01

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 56)

.04, ns

.19, ns

.13, ns

1.98, ns

1.71, ns

3.56, ns

Mood

Partial η2

.00

.00

.00

.03

.03

.06

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 56)

.15, ns

1.70, ns

.32, ns

2.72, ns

2.54, ns

.03, ns

Group x Mood

Partial η2

.00

.03

.01

.05

.04

.00

Note. Rt = response time; Conf = confidence rating; d’ = memory sensitivity; Meta-d’ = metacognitive sensitivity; Meta-d’ – d’ = mean difference between
metacognitive sensitivity and memory sensitivity; Low conf region = distance between type-2 criterion axis (S1) and type-2 criterion axis (S2).
*p < .01. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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C. 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed ANOVA Results: Experiment 3
Dependent variable
Rt (ms)

Conf

d’

Meta-d’

Meta-d’ – d’

Low conf
region

Valence

F(1, 64)

5.53*

23.40***

7.87**

3.71, ns

.03, ns

6.50*

Partial η2

.08

.27

.11

.06

.00

.09

F(1, 64)

2.70, ns

11.11**

3.31, ns

.24, ns

5.11*

16.06***

Partial η2

.04

.15

.05

.00

.07

.20

F(1, 64)

.01, ns

.97, ns

1.35, ns

3.14, ns

.72, ns

.11, ns

Partial η2

.00

.02

.02

.05

.01

.00

F(1, 64)

.20, ns

5.69*

1.74, ns

.38, ns

.53, ns

3.43, ns

Partial η2

.00

.08

.03

.00

.01

.05

F(1, 64)

.16, ns

.70, ns

1.63, ns

.02, ns

.54, ns

1.48, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.03

.00

.01

.02

Valence x Group

F(1, 64)

.54, ns

10.20**

.16, ns

5.76*

4.49*

2.69, ns

x Task

Partial η2

.01

.14

.00

.08

.07

.04

Cue

F(1, 64)

34.41***

45.13***

25.89***

25.71***

2.81, ns

5.29*

Partial η2

.35

.41

.29

. 36

.04

.08

F(1, 64)

.22, ns

.60, ns

.01, ns

2.42, ns

1.50, ns

.00, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.00

.04

.02

.00

F(1, 64)

5.18*

1.45, ns

.54, ns

.16, ns

.51, ns

.39, ns

Partial η2

.08

.02

.01

.00

.01

.01

Group
Valence x Group
Task
Valence x Task

Cue x Group
Cue x Task
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Cue x Group x

F(1, 64)

2.12, ns

.00, ns

2.36, ns

.10, ns

1.20, ns

1.22, ns

Task

Partial η2

.03

.00

.04

.00

.02

.02

Valence x Cue

F(1, 64)

.08, ns

.42, ns

1.00, ns

1.96, ns

2.53, ns

.90, ns

Partial η2

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

.01

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 64)

1.59, ns

.07, ns

.18, ns

1.52, ns

.49, ns

.06, ns

Group

Partial η2

.02

.00

.00

.02

.01

.00

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 64)

.01, ns

5.63*

.38, ns

3.00, ns

2.67, ns

5.46*

Task

Partial η2

.00

.08

.01

.05

.04

.08

Valence x Cue x

F(1, 64)

.62, ns

.08, ns

.06, ns

4.87*

2.31, ns

2.41, ns

Group x Task

Partial η2

.01

.00

.00

.07

.04

.04

Note. Rt = response time; Conf = confidence rating; d’ = memory sensitivity; Meta-d’ = metacognitive sensitivity; Meta-d’ – d’ = mean difference between
metacognitive sensitivity and memory sensitivity; Low conf region = distance between type-2 criterion axis (S1) and type-2 criterion axis (S2).
*p < .01. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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